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ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 
CONTRACTING COMMAND – KUWAIT 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study of the U.S. Army Contracting Command – Kuwait (USACC-KU) 
used an organizational systems framework to analyze factors related to strategy 
structure, processes and results experienced at USACC-KU during 2006-2008.  
The researcher’s experience at the command coupled with survey data from 
employees and mid and senior level managers was used to analyze the 
organization as a system.  Conclusions and recommendations regarding the 
assessment include: 1)  Key variables appeared to be incongruent, which may 
have contributed to documented organizational dysfunctions; 2)  The command 
should initiate meaningful morale building events into the command’s schedule 
and encourage use of existing morale, welfare, and recreation activities; and 3) 
Recommend the command establish clear and compelling short and long range 
goals, involve personnel and communicate goals throughout the command, and 
establish metrics to ensure and track implementation of needed changes.  
Looking at an organization as a system through a comprehensive analysis, 
provides leaders with a diagnostic tool to assess the health of the organization, 
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A. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis conducted an organizational analysis of the U.S. Army 
Contracting Command–Kuwait (USACC-KU) to describe how external 
environmental and internal organizational factors may have contributed to 
degraded performance.   General systems theory and, in particular, an 
organizational systems model, provided the theoretical foundation for drawing 
conclusions and making recommendations concerning complex organizational 
behaviors, including fraudulent and inappropriate contracting activity.  The overall 
purpose was to analyze how incongruency among key organizational variables 
can foreshadow and degrade performance.  The intent was to assist leaders, 
managers, and practitioners in ways to improve the fit among relevant variables, 
thereby improving system or organizational performance.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
To assess USACC-KU, an Organizational Systems Framework (OSF) 
Model1 was applied to the organization.  An overview and a description of the 
command are provided, reflecting various inputs (i.e., external environment and 
system direction), throughputs or design factors (to include its people, tasks, 
structure, processes, and technology), and results (culture, outcome and 
outputs).  Elements of the OSF model are defined further, along with a detailed 
description of USACC-KU utilizing the OSF model as a guide.  The model 
application includes the researcher’s personal experience and interactions while 
working eight months on temporary assignment at USACC-KU, along with 
information management provided to outside review and inspection entities, and 
responses to a semi-structured survey.  The researcher deployed to Kuwait as a 
                                            
1 Dr. Nancy Roberts, Organizational Systems Framework Model, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2000.  
 2
team member of Army Contracting Agency’s Independent Review Team 
(discussed later in this paper) to review all contract actions exceeding $500,000.  
Upon mission completion, the role changed from an external reviewer (meaning 
from outside the command) to a member of the USACC-KU team reviewing all 
actions over $100,000 prior to release, drafting and implementing policies and 
procedures along with other Procurement Analyst (PA) type duties.  Two-thirds of 
the time spent in the command was as the sole PA for the command.  This 
enabled exposure to the majority, if not all of the command’s personnel, and 
provided an opportunity to become involved in a many different facets of the 
command’s functions.  
The survey was disseminated and responses were received via electronic 
mail.  This ensured consistency in the information requested and was efficient 
since several of the respondents are still in Kuwait.  Three different question sets, 
approved by the Naval Postgraduate School, were disseminated dependant upon 
the role and position of the respondent: employee, middle management, or 
senior leadership.  Employees include any personnel in non-supervisory 
positions (to include contracting officers and contract specialists) at USACC-KU 
during 2006-2008.  Included are a mixture of civilian employees, military 
members, and contractor employees.  Middle management includes division and 
operations chiefs as well as executive officers.  Senior leadership consists of the 
Deputy to the Commander and the Commander, as well as Brigade leadership at 
the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) level.  Additionally, 
individuals in review team roles from other organizations were surveyed to 
receive a broad range of perspectives.2  A total of 70 personnel were solicited for 
input via the survey and 23 provided a response.  More information regarding the 
survey data is discussed in Chapter IV.   
                                            
2 All levels of personnel represented in the surveys are a mix of civilian and military 
personnel.  Contractor personnel were supplied the employee level survey, however, none 
responded.   
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. LITERARY REVIEW 
Despite the existence of several organizational analysis projects, the 
researcher was unable to locate any specifically addressing USACC-KU.  Articles 
and notes from courses attended at the Naval Postgraduate School were 
reviewed throughout the development of this paper, and those utilized are 
referenced.   Additionally, summary data from various command briefing slides 
were referred to and referenced.  Multiple articles located on the World Wide 
Web were reviewed along with the “Gansler Report” (explained and referenced 
later in this paper).  Additional information stemmed from the researcher’s 
personal observations while at the command. 
B. PROJECT STRUCTURE 
The primary research question of this thesis is “How can an organizational 
systems assessment be used to explain organizational and behavioral results – 
intended and unintended consequences – experienced at the U.S. Army 
Contracting Command-Kuwait during the 2006-2008 timeframe?”  A greater 
understanding of an organization as a system is empowering to leaders.  
Analyzing an organization through a systems approach encourages practitioners 
to examine interdependencies among the organization and environmental factors 
in a deliberate manner.  It is essential to understand these interdependencies 
among variables, or the relative “fit” of variables determines performance.  The 
model is about cause-and-effect relationships, which may be far apart in time 
and/or location.    
A description of USACC-KU is provided in Chapter III using the OSF 
model to describe the organization as a system.  Based on the model, the 
description is organized into three major subjects: 
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1. Inputs  
Inputs are external influences or factors fed into the system. They may 
include raw data or pre-existing data provided by the external system3 to include: 
• Environmental factors, such as political, economic, social, and 
technological forces or trends;  
• Key factors for the organization to be successful; and 
• System direction, to include its mission, vision, goals, strategic 
issues, and mandates. 
2. Throughputs  
Throughputs are factors involved with the transformation of input into 
output (also referred to as design factors).  In this model, they include: 
• Tasks – The basic tasks, jobs or core competencies of the 
organization; 
• Technology – The condition of the facilities and equipment, work 
flow, activities involved in the work flow, etc.; 
• Structure – The organization chart reflecting groupings of people, 
how tasks and/or roles are combined, etc.; 
• People – Types of people making up the organization, types of 
• experiences, skills, knowledge and abilities, motivational factors, 
etc.; and 
• Processes – Planning, communication, human resource 
management, training plans, etc. 
3. Results  
Results are intentional and unintentional end products of the system. They 
include: 
• Culture - Includes the behavioral norms and values, how conflict is 
managed, impact of culture on the organization, informal patterns of 
interaction, etc.; 
                                            
3 Anthony Verstraete, Systems Approach & I-P-O-Model, September 1, 1997. 
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• Outputs – Results of the process on the input.  This includes what 
the system has to offer (products or services), how they are 
measured, and indicators of performance; and 
• Outcomes – How the outputs are viewed in terms of the 
environment and the consequences to the stakeholders.   
To better understand the three main components of the OSF model, an 
illustration is provided in Figure 1.  Displaying the model in a chart format  
reflects how the system is open and influenced by external environmental 
factors, how output can be substantially different from input, and that throughput 
is not just a passive tube, but an active processor4 impacted by numerous 
factors.  This figure serves as a ready reference for the reader throughout the 
paper. 
                                            
4 F. Heylighen, “Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach,” Principia Cybernetica Website, 
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Figure 1.   Organizational Systems Framework Model, from Professor Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000 
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Following the systems description of the organization in Chapter III, 
Chapter IV provides statistical information regarding the survey responses (e.g., 
number of responses from each grouping, average education and experience, 
etc.), and the survey questions.  Chapter V provides an analysis of the data 
received using the systems approach, specifically the OSF model.  Included in 
the analysis are the researcher’s observations while serving in the command 
from October 2007 to June 2008, and data extracted from the survey responses.  
Conclusions and recommendations for current and future leaders are outlined in 
the final two chapters. 
C. HISTORY OF USACC-KU 
The U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) and the Coalition 
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), moved from Camp Doha to Camp 
Arifjan, Kuwait in April of 2004, a year after the U.S invasion of Iraq.  Included in 
this move was U.S. Army Contracting Command Southwest Asia-Kuwait, now 
titled U.S. Army Contracting Command-Kuwait (USACC-KU).  Its mission is to 
provide contracting support to the aforementioned commands as well as the Area 
Support Group-Kuwait (ASG-KU) and the Theatre Sustainment Command (TSC).  
USACC-KU is lead by an Army O-5 and consists of a mix of both military and 
civilian acquisition professionals. 
The command hit center stage in the media during the summer of 2007 
when Army Major John Cockerham, Jr., was indicted on six counts for a variety 
of offenses from conspiring to defraud the United States to destroying documents 
to be used in official proceedings.5  Major Cockerham, a warranted Contracting 
Officer for the U.S. Army at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, took nearly $10 million in 
bribes between 2004 and 2005.6  As the authorities looked deeper into these 
                                            
5 Indictment:  U.S. v. John Cockerham, Jr., Melissa Cockerham, Carolyn Blake, A.K.A. Carol 
Bradshaw, Defendants.  Filed 2007 August 22.  Clerk, U.S. District Court Western District of 
Texas. 
6 Army Times, September 10, 2007, “Contract Fraud Allegations Spur Investigations.” 
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actions, they identified several contractors working with him to defraud the U.S. 
Government as well as other Army officials from the requiring activities who 
originally requested the items or services Major Cockerham procured.  These 
charges brought a high level of interest from Army senior leaders regarding 
contracting activity in Kuwait.  Although MAJ Cockerham was not indicted until 
August 2007, the Criminal Investigation Command established a fraud office in 
Kuwait with specially trained agents in 2006 who were already investigating 
numerous procurement fraud allegations in the area, to include MAJ 
Cockerham’s case.  In December 2006, Army Major Gloria Davis died of self 
inflicted gunshot wounds while deployed to Iraq – just one day after admitting to 
Army investigators she accepted over $225,000 in bribes from contractors while 
serving as a warranted contracting officer at USACC-KU months earlier.  As of 
October 2007, thirteen personnel involved with contracting in Kuwait were 
charged with corruption in federal courts, eight of which pleaded guilty.  
Pandora’s box was opened.   
To help close the box, the Army brought in a new PARC (O-6) and 
USACC-KU Commander (O-5) in June 2007 with a mandate to stop fraud, 
implement sound business practices and turn the organization around.  Within  
months, deputies to both positions (GS-15 and GS-14) were on board.  The first 
step in meeting their mandate was to identify existing problems.  Therefore, at 
the direction of the Secretary of the Army, different agencies began sending 
teams to the region to assist the organization by looking into the practices and 
procedures of USACC-KU.  Agencies including the Army Audit Agency, Criminal 
Investigation Command (CIC), an Independent Review Team (IRT) comprised of 
Army Contracting Agency personnel,7 and an Army Contracting Task Force - a 
team of hand-picked Army officers (O-4s and O-5s) representing LTG N. Ross 
Thompson III, Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics and Technology).  LTG Thompson’s Task Force (commonly referred to 
as the “Thompson Ten”) was stood up to reinforce and immediately address 
                                            
7 The researcher originally deployed to Kuwait as a member of the IRT. 
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existing contracting issues and aggressively implement fixes as problems were 
identified.8  Of the roughly 6,000 contracts worth over $2.8 billion issued by the 
Kuwait office since 2003, the Thompson Ten reviewed 340 under $25,000 in 
value and just over 300 with a value over $25,000.  The results of their findings 
were reported directly to LTG Thompson.  Hundreds of other contract files were 
boxed up and sent to TACOM for review by a separate review team along with a 
copy of the contract database.  Many actions were referred to the CIC and as of 
January 16, 2008, more than 20 military and civilian employees had been 
charged with accepting bribes or kickbacks.9  Aside from the various review 
teams, many high level visitors traveled to Kuwait to meet with senior leadership, 
including the Secretary of the Army.   
The reviews and inspections surfaced many issues, aside from apparent 
illegal activity, to include: 
• Approximately 750 unprocessed or unpaid claims (totaling over $65M);  
• 43 instances where personnel, other than those authorized, obligated 
the Government (totaling over $1M) to pay for items or services not 
originally covered by a contractual vehicle (referred to as an 
Unauthorized Commitment); 
• Over 13,000 contract actions not closed out (which is the last step in 
the acquisition cycle); and 
• An enormous amount of inadequate contract files due to: 
o No sole source justifications 
o Modifications without supporting documentation 
o Few legal reviews 
o Inconsistent and missing receiving and payment documentation 
o Missing contract files 
o Unliquidated obligations 
Although there were known issues surrounding the contracting operations in 
Kuwait, the extent of these problems was unknown when the reviews began. 
                                            
8 Army Press Release, “Army Takes Further Action to Fight Fraud,” August 29, 2007. 
9 Philadelphia Inquirer, “Oversight of Iraq Contracts is Shifted Amid Army Probes,” January 
16, 2008, 
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In August 2007, predominantly due to the Kuwait contracting crisis, the 
Secretary of the Army established a Special Commission on Army Contracting 
led by the Honorable Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.  The Commission was chartered to 
examine theater acquisition and program management processes; review 
management controls to prevent fraud, waste and abuse; assess legislative 
needs; and recommend changes in policies and procedures.10  The Commission 
was on site at USACC-KU in September and interviewed all personnel on board 
at the time, both as a group and on an individual basis.  On October 31, 2007, 
the Commission issued their report entitled “Urgent Reform Required: Army 
Expeditionary Contracting, Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations,” commonly referred to as the 
“Gansler Report.”  The report included findings in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait 
and direct quotes from many personnel from USACC-KU.  It included four major 
recommendations: 
1) Increase stature, quantity and career development of the Army’s 
contracting personnel, military and civilian (especially for 
Expeditionary operations);   
2) Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate 
contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS 
operations; 
3) Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary operations; and 
4) Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable 
contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations. 
The results were briefed to Congress who dictated immediate changes, 
some of which are already implemented.  In February 2008, the Army approved 
the establishment of the new Army Contracting Command (ACC) to include a 
Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) to support installation 
contracting in the U.S. and overseas, and an Expeditionary Contracting 
Command (ECC) to oversee mobilization of contracting efforts in places like Iraq, 
                                            
10 “Army Takes Further Action to Fight Fraud.”  
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Afghanistan, and Kuwait11 (Recommendation #2 of the Gansler Report). In July 
2008, the White House approved the Army’s request for five additional General 
Officer slots (two major generals and three brigadier generals) to oversee 
purchasing and monitor contractor performance12 (Recommendation #1 of the 
Gansler Report).  One of the new major general positions will be to command the 
ACC.  Considering the Commission’s results were issued the end of October 
2007, the government has acted quickly (by its own standards) to implement 
many of the Gansler Report recommendations. 
Dr. Gansler’s Commission and report, VIP visits, CIC, Thompson Ten, and 
the IRT all provided assistance to USACC-KU, whether visiting to bring attention 
to the area or by reviewing/inspecting records.  However, this assistance also 
meant all eyes were on USACC-KU. 
In the fall of 2007, a decision was made and briefed to the Secretary of the 
Army that all actions exceeding $1 million would be transferred to the Acquisition 
Center at Rock Island, IL, via the “Reachback” program, effective October 1, 
2007.  By January 2008, the control of twelve major contracts for maintenance 
and other support work were transferred to Rock Island13 with some 
administration delegated to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  
This move did not reflect poor performance by the contractors or identification of 
fraudulent activities; it was based on the dollar value and complexity of the 
contract.  The intent was to transfer work out of USACC-KU to reduce the 
workload and shift it to an organization with a stable workforce of personnel 
experienced in complex acquisitions.  An intended outcome included geographic 
separation of the contractor and the contracting personnel.  Eliminating the daily 
face-to-face interaction and removing the contracting personnel from the cultural 
                                            
11 Army Times, Army Creates New Contracting Command, by Richard Lardner, February 29, 
2008, 
12 Richard Lardner, “White House Grants Army Request for More Brass,” ABC News, 
Channel 5, Twin Cities, MN, July 2, 2008. 
13 Philadelphia Inquirer,  “Oversight of Iraq Contracts is Shifted Amid Army Probes,” January 
16, 2008. 
 12
environment where bribes are a part of doing business was an effort to reduce 
possible fraudulent behavior.  The transfer of workload did not stop at the initial 
twelve contracts.  Several other contracts were “nominated” for transfer and 
discussed between Rock Island and USACC-KU leadership.  The transfer limited 
the USACC-KU workload to simplified acquisitions to award and administer; a 
more manageable workload given the capacity of the organization. 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF USACC-KU AS A SYSTEM USING THE 
OSF MODEL  
The purpose of this section is to describe the U.S. Army Contracting 
Command-Kuwait (USACC-KU) as a system using the Organizational Systems 
Framework (OSF) model14.  A system is defined as a set of interrelated 
components working towards a common purpose.  The model is based on the 
concept of inputs, throughputs, and results.  The input is what is received 
from the external environment and the output is what leaves the system back 
into the environment.  The transformation of the input by the system to an output 
is called the throughput15.   
The basic systems approach to organizations acknowledges the existence 
of open systems; meaning they interact with other systems outside of themselves 
and this interaction includes inputs (what enters the system from outside) and 
outputs (what leaves the system for the environment).  The OSF model breaks 
down these two components into subcategories and includes the throughput, 
which occurs between the inputs and outputs.  As mentioned in the “Structure of  
Project” portion of this paper, inputs include:  external environment, system 
direction, and key success factors.  Throughput, referred to as Design Factors 
in the OSF, consists of: tasks/jobs, technology, structure, people, and processes 
or subsystems.  Culture, outputs, and outcomes make up the results portion of 
the model.  To gain insight into USACC-KU, the OSF model is applied based on 
the researcher’s close experience working in the organization, discussions with 
leadership, briefing slides and other applicable documents from the command.  
                                            
 14 Dr. Nancy Roberts, Organizational Systems Framework Model, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2000. 
15 Heylighen, “Basic Concepts of a Systems Approach.” 
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A. INPUTS 
1. External Environment 
Environmental issues external to the organization itself can affect its 
operations.  In the OSF model, they are categorized as political, technological, 
social, and economic factors or influences which make up the environment where 
the system or organization exists.  The external environment of USACC-KU can 
have a substantial impact on the organization considering its geographic location.  
It is located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, approximately 100 miles south of the border 
of Iraq and less than 30 miles from Saudi Arabia (see Figure 2).   
 




2. Location of Camp Arifjan 
The Camp was originally established by the Kuwaiti and U.S. 
Governments to support a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team set of prepositioned 
equipment on an on-going basis.  However, since the start of the War in Iraq in 
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2003, Camp Arifjan has become the primary logistics support hub supporting the 
efforts in Iraq causing the size of the camp to grow substantially.  The Kuwaiti 
government is resistant to a permanent presence by the United States, allowing 
the U.S. to erect temporary buildings and structures to house a variety of 
Government offices and equipment.  Therefore, plumbing cannot be installed 
causing the need for additional structures and contract support for life support 
services such as individual latrine units, trash removal, bulk water delivery, etc. 
Working in a command considered part of a combat zone impacts the 
organization in several ways.  Although it is not close to the “front line” action of 
the war, results of the conflict can be seen around the Camp at the Level III 
trauma center, the dining facilities or other Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 
(MWR) locations, and an area called “Zone 6” which houses the transient units 
who run missions up through Iraq or provide convoy support to others.  Patrons 
at the dining and MWR facilities often have visible injuries and the hospital has a 
busy MEDVAC helicopter pad.  Occupants in Zone 6 live in large tents with 
separate shower trailers, wear worn or “heavily used” uniforms, and many times 
are covered in dirt and sand.  Even though the sounds of war are not heard often 
around Camp Arifjan, the visual reminder is always present. 
Since USACC-KU is operating inside of an Arab country, the social 
environment can also impact on the organization.  The majority of the companies 
awarded contracts to support the military operations originate from Middle-
Eastern countries.  Therefore, the language barrier and the cultural differences 
affect contracting operations at all points in the acquisition process.  For 
example, gestures that are meaningless in Western culture could be offensive in 
Arab culture.  Showing the soles of shoes while sitting is considered rude and 
symbolic of “you being beneath my feet.”  Placing a half closed fist in front of the 
stomach then turning it slightly implies you think the other person is a liar.16  
They see it as “You’re lying,” where in America, the gesture is unnoticeable to 
                                            
16 Arab Cultural Awareness: 58 Factsheets, TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 2, January 9, 
2006, 22. 
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most. From discussing the solicitation requirements and ensuring comprehension 
of the required work to the actual contract performance (contractor employees 
interacting with U.S. Government representatives), these social differences can 
impact stakeholders (e.g., soldiers, contractors, contracting office personnel), 
thereby impacting USACC-KU. 
Living and working in an austere environment impacts USACC-KU.  For 
most, the tour is unaccompanied leaving large geographic distances between the 
staff member and their friends and families.  The majority of the permanent party 
personnel live on the economy and amongst an Arab culture which is extremely 
different for the majority of people.  Others live in barracks-style housing on 
camp, with two bedrooms, sharing a bathroom and kitchen area.  The temporary 
duty personnel live on the camp in Containerized Housing Units (commonly 
referred to as CHUs).  The CHUs are stacked in rows with one on top of another.  
The units are approximately ten feet by eighteen feet, include a metal-framed, 
twin-size mattress (no box springs), two wall lockers, two end tables and a 
television stand.  A tenant can borrow a television from the housing office, if 
interested, to view Armed Forces Network programming.  Wireless Internet is 
available, but rarely usable due to intermittent connectivity issues.  Restroom 
facilities are located at the end of each row of CHUs and separated by gender.  
They are not kept clean to what most deem acceptable by U.S. standards, but 
are usable and the only option.  Laundry trailers are located outside of the CHU 
area with limited air conditioning — and aromas often less than tolerable due to 
the nature of local plumbing.   
Kuwait has a desert climate with very hot and dry summers, dust storms,  
and limited rainfall (3”- 6” annually), as seen in the photograph below.  The 
average temperatures in the summer (May to October) range from 108F to 
115F.17  Add wind, and it feels like Mother Nature is turning on a hairdryer.  
During the winter months (November to April), temperatures may occasionally 
                                            
17 Country Handbook for Kuwait, November 2002, DOD-2630-KWT-004-03, 7. 
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drop to the freezing point at night.  Although the majority of the work at USACC-
KU is conducted indoors, personnel must go outside throughout the day to 
access the latrines and the dining facilities.  Many times, the air conditioning in a 
car does not cool down by the time one drives to the chow halls.  Working and 
living in a combat zone in the middle of an Arab culture while in austere living 
conditions affect the individuals in the command, thereby, impacting USACC-KU. 
 
Figure 3.   Dust storm at Camp Arifjan18 
 
  
The politics surrounding the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGAP) III contract likely also impacted USACC-KU.  LOGCAP supported the 
brunt of the contract services in Kuwait until the public demanded a decrease 
due to scandals surrounding the Prime Contractor, Kellogg, Brown and Root 
(KBR).  Numerous accusations surrounded the firm; from former employees 
                                            
18 Photograph taken by researcher while serving in Kuwait. 
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being indicted on charges of defrauding the United States, to price gouging on 
numerous contract services in Iraq and Kuwait.  As a result of public pressure 
upon Congress that flowed to the Department of Defense (DoD), contracted 
effort shifted from LOGCAP to direct local contracts, the LOGCAP workload went 
from over $1.4B in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 to just under $200M in FY 2008, a 
600% decrease in LOGCAP workload (see Figure 4).  Much of the decreased 
LOGCAP workload was directly transferred to USACC-KU.   
 














Additionally during this period, Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) services of contract oversight and administration decreased along with 
support provided by KBR through LOGCAP.  Large portions of the workload no 
longer covered by LOGCAP and DCMA became the responsibility of USACC-
KU. 
                                            
19 ACC-KU In-Brief slides, Slide 10, LTC Doug Kiser, May 10, 2008, 
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Prior to the invasion of Iraq, approximately 1,500 soldiers were supported 
by USACC-KU.  These 1,500 soldiers were part of the peacetime effort stationed 
in Kuwait on an on-going basis.   After the war began in FY 2003, the primary 
mission in Kuwait became Receiving, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSOI) 
for troops serving in Iraq.  Additional soldiers assigned to Kuwait performed 
convoy operations and logistics functions.  The average amount of soldiers now 
assigned to Kuwait is around 30,000.  Approximately 140,000 Soldiers, Sailors 
Airmen and Marines process through Kuwait and into Iraq each year.  These 
troops receive services provided via contracts awarded by Kuwait contracting:  
laundry service, DFAC service, and other life support.  Congress approved a 
20,000 soldier “surge” in the Iraq AOR during FY 2007, increasing those 
supported by the Kuwait office by an additional 20,000.  The more troops to 
support, the more contract support required.  Whether it is an increase in the 
quantity of contracts or modifications to expand the scope of work or to increase 
contract line items, it equates to additional workload.   
The rise in troop levels and decreased support by LOGCAP and DCMA 
contributed to the increased workload at USACC-KU.  The chart below (Figure 5) 
reflects the amount of troops supported and the increased workload by showing 
the actual obligations experienced at the command between FY 2002 and FY 
2007.  The annual obligations grew from approximately $177M to $938M 
(approximately 500% increase in obligations). 
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Figure 5.    Kuwait Contracting Growth20 
Kuwait Contracting Growth



































































In summation, operating inside of a combat zone, interacting with an 
unfamiliar culture, and trying to support an additional workload of approximately 
500% while living and working in austere conditions are a few of many examples 
of how external environment factors can impact USACC-KU as a system.  An 
additional input for an organization as a system is identifying key factors for its 
success. 
3. Key Success Factors 
According to the OSF model, an element that affects an organizations 
future success is contained in the question, “What does it take for the 
organization to be successful?” (e.g., what factors are crucial for success). These 
key factors may change from year to year based on the priorities and other 
external environmental issues.   
                                            
20 ACC-KU In-Brief slides, Slide 11. 
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Based on the problems of corruption surrounding the USACC-KU over the 
past several years, the implementation of checks and balances to avoid any 
reoccurrence was a priority for the new command to ensure future success.  The 
contracting command would need to effectively and efficiently process contract 
actions meeting customers’ requirements in a timely and cost effective manner.  
Contracts need to be awarded in compliance with federal, DoD, Army, brigade 
level, and local regulations and policies, and represent the best value to the 
Government (i.e., the soldiers being supported) while ensuring appropriate use of 
American tax payer dollars.  These factors define success for USACC-KU. 
4. System Direction 
Direction setting includes identification of its mission, vision, values, goals, 
strategic plans, and any mandates levied on the organization.  The current 
Commander assumed command of USACC-KU in June of 2007, the same month 
as the new 408th Contract Support Brigade (CSB) Commander, who also serves 
as the PARC.  Their assignment came in the midst of many indictments and 
investigations related to Army contracting in Kuwait. The fraud, abuse and 
basically poor contracting, enormously impacted the command.  Once Pandora’s 
box was opened and various teams dove into the issues surrounding the 
command, the findings reflected a troubled procurement office.   
The primary tasking for the new leadership at both the Brigade and 
USACC-KU command level was to put USACC-KU on a path to recovery (e.g., 
ensure implementation of proper business practices, recruit personnel with the 
right skill sets and experience, etc.) and ensure measures were in place to 
prevent future fraud and abuse.  Additionally, they focused on implementing 
standard processes and procedures to improve the contracting organization as 
well as its products and customer service. 
Part of the remedy to “fix” the command included the mandate by the 
PARC (endorsed by the Secretary of the Army) to transfer all actions exceeding 
$1 million to the “reachback” program at the Acquisition Center located at Rock 
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Island, IL.  USACC-KU changed from handling all base level contracting support 
for the region to only procuring those supplies and services less than $1 million 
(Simplified Acquisition Threshold per the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)).  
Not only did this decision substantially decrease the quantity of contracting 
actions processed by the command, but the complexity level decreased as well.   
Although the 408th CSB is based out of Fort McPherson, GA, the new 
commander elected to move “forward” full time and deploy with a staff to Camp 
Arifjan.  The brigade includes both the Qatar and Kuwait contracting offices, but 
the primary focus (up through the Secretary of the Army) remained at USACC-
KU.  Being in close geographic proximity, the PARC became involved with the 
daily operations of the command, which in comparison with Army contracting 
operations in the U.S., is not the norm.  Having the senior level management 
from a higher headquarters heavily involved in daily operations can impact the 
direction of the organization or “system.”  The goals and mandates of USACC-
KU may be influenced or directed by the PARC’s office and their focus areas.   
Upon assumption of command for USACC-KU, the commander received 
the following mandates from the PARC: 
1) Establish procedures to prevent unethical behavior; 
2) Implement processes to ensure effective customer support; and 
3) Resolve outstanding claims and unauthorized commitments. 
These mandates were not received in a formal document, but through an initial 
briefing and subsequent email and face-to-face interaction between the USACC-
KU Commander and the PARC.21 
By January 2008, the USACC-KU commander issued and posted the 
following Mission and Vision Statements on the interior of all of the exit doors of 
the building for all personnel to take notice: 
 
 
                                            
21 Information gained in discussions with an anonymous member of the PARC staff. 
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• Mission Statement – “USACC-KU provides installation and theatre-
level contracting support to CFLCC/ USARCENT and deployed 
units in the Kuwait area of operations that enable Warfighters to 
accomplish their mission.”   
• Vision Statement – “Provide world-class contracting support with 
aprofessional and dedicated team that is committed to integrity, 
sound business judgment, and process improvement to achieve 
customer satisfaction.”   
Although the mission and vision statement were posted, they were not 
addressed by leadership during one-on-one interactions with command members or 
in frequent “All Hands” meetings where the entire command assembles. 
The reachback initiative and other mandates from the PARC were clear.  The 
mission and vision statements established by the USACC-KU were also clear.  The 
day-to-day direction of the organization was not clear.  An example of this is contract 
closeout.  The command designated contract closeout as a priority since over 
13,000 contract actions remained open after the delivery date or period of 
performance had ended.  An AF Captain was designated as the lead and, 
eventually, a team was formed to focus on the effort.  Reports were run; processes 
and progress developed.  The team leader was tasked to redirect her focus on 
combining life support contracts to transition to the reachback program.  Some team 
members continued with the closeout effort while others worked various projects that 
arose.  The initiative was reenergized when a contractor employee was designated 
the lead.  He developed tighter processes and procedures and almost completed the 
team’s mission of closing out all applicable actions for FY 2007 and 2008 when 
reassigned to another team as a contract specialist.  Division management tracked 
the number of closeouts accomplished in weekly status reports required for the 
PARC.  The PARC had no interest in closeouts as he had higher priorities; therefore, 
the workload was not reflected in weekly progress briefings from USACC-KU.   
B. DESIGN FACTORS 
Design Factors, in the OSF model, refer to the throughputs, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘black box of management.’  Throughputs are where various  
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inputs are acted on to create results.  These include tasks or basic jobs, 
technology, structure, people, and processes or subsystems.  Each of these 
factors are addressed below: 
1. Tasks 
Part of the throughput are the tasks of the organization.  These are the 
actual basic tasks, jobs, or functions performed by the organization.  This factor 
includes how they are formalized, how they vary, and what specification is 
required.  The basic tasks for USACC-KU are outlined in the following 
paragraphs.  
During FY 2006 and 2007, the core competency for the command was to 
provide contract support for all installation level supplies or services for the U.S. 
military operations in Kuwait and those launched from Kuwait into Iraq in support 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  The customer base included active duty Army, 
Guard and Reserve units, Navy Seabees and port operators, Marine personnel 
and some Air Force operations as well.  These customers are located throughout 
Kuwait to include several Camps, port operations at the Kuwait Naval Base, and 
Ali Al Salem (the Life Support Area for Intra-theatre air-flow personnel flights in 
and out of the country operating out of Kuwait International Airport).  Some of the 
services included: 
• Base operations for each Camp in Kuwait; 
• Hauling of equipment in and out of Iraq (referred to as heavy lift); 
• Storing and inventorying of soldiers Individual Body Armor (IBA) 
while they left theatre for mandatory and other leave periods; 
• Utilities such as power generation, internet, telephone, and cable 
television; 
• Laundry services for both soldiers and medical facilities; 
• Generator maintenance; 
• Dining facility operations throughout Kuwait; 
• Various custodial services to include hospital cleaning; 
•  Housing services for both on and off post billeting; 
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• Shuttle bus services to move soldiers around the camps; 
• Lease or purchase of tents, to include their set up and insulation; 
•  Bottled water and bagged ice; 
• Desktop and laptop computers along with other peripheral 
information technology equipment; 
• Material handling equipment; and 
• An array of supplies required to keep the Camps operational and to 
support soldiers moving forward into Iraq. 
The tasks required at USACC-KU are similar in nature to any other Army 
contracting office.  Regulations and policies prescribe the majority of the steps 
necessary to write, award, and administer contracts.  Until October 2007, 
USACC-KU processed both complex, large dollar acquisitions as well as smaller 
projects processed utilizing Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP), authorized 
by FAR Part 13, for actions under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) of 
$1 million when supporting contingency operations.22  The primary tasks required 
are outlined in the FAR, the Defense and Army Supplements (referred to as 
DFARS and AFARS), as well as Army policy.  However, no Standard Operating 
Procedures existed to formalize essential acquisition processes and procedures 
locally. 
The steps differ for processing large dollar versus actions under the SAT.  
Regulations require different steps and documentation based on the acquisition 
procedures utilized for the individual procurement.  For example, if SAP is not 
used for a negotiated procurement, the Contracting Specialist/Officer is required 
to complete a Prenegotiation Objective Memorandum (POM).  The POM outlines 
the procurement process by listing the offerors and their proposed pricing, 
explaining whether socio-economic programs were utilized during the solicitation 
process, whether competition by multiple sources was sought, and other 
pertinent information necessary to tell the “story” of the specific procurement.  
Depending on the dollar amount, this may need approval by the PARC or even 
                                            
22 Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 2. 101. 
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higher up the chain of command.  Following the negotiations, a Price Negotiation 
Memorandum (PNM) is required to reflect the outcome of the negotiations, 
determination of fair and reasonable, and other information for the reader to 
understand what occurred during the negotiations and why the objectives were or 
were not met, etc.  Neither of these documents are required when procuring 
using SAP.  One major emphasis of FAR Part 13 is limited documentation and 
minimal determinations by the contracting personnel.  With the mandate to only 
process actions less than SAP, the detailed tasks for the organization changed. 
Once contracts are awarded (meaning signed by the contracting officer), 
contract administration requirements begin.  This includes ensuring items 
ordered are delivered timely, coordinating with the Contracting Officer’s 
Representatives (CORs) regarding contractor performance, negotiating any 
necessary changes in the contract, modifying contracts, assisting vendors with 
payment problems, and eventually closing out the contract once full performance 
and payment is verified.  Closing a contract is final administrative step required in 
the acquisition process indicating all actions are complete.  Once closed, both 
hard and electronic copies must be retained for various time frames per the FAR. 
Although the individual steps or tasks may vary based on the dollar 
amount and other procurement variables, the overall “big picture” tasks are 
relatively the same.  Regardless of the complexity, procedures used, etc., the 
requirement must be adequately defined by the customer, some sort of 
solicitation is conducted to receive quotes or offers, contract awards are 
processed, and some level of contract administration is required.  The sub-tasks 
will vary but the overarching process remains.  With the decision for Rock Island 
to process all actions over the SAP, the individual tasks for USACC-KU changed 
dramatically between FY 2007 and 2008. 
Another function within the organization includes writing policies and 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) as well as providing procurement 
guidance to the staff.  An inadequate desktop guide, dating back to 2006, existed 
in the command but its use was not encouraged or enforced.  In an effort to 
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separate USACC-KU from its past, leadership required new SOPs be issued 
under the current commander’s signature by topic area rather than an all-
encompassing guide.  The researcher is unable to ascertain when the use of the 
guidebook diminished in its entirety.  Regardless, current local guidance was 
lacking.  Early in 2008, developing SOPs or policy within the command became 
the responsibility of the Procurement Analyst.  SOPs are developed using 
published guidance/policy from higher headquarters up through regulations at the 
federal level.  Expertise and experience is applied in determining the best 
processes and procedures at the command level.  Once they are drafted, all 
division chiefs are afforded the opportunity to provide input with a specified 
number of days.  Comments are compiled and incorporated, if needed, then 
submitted to the commander for signature and implementation.   
Leadership identified the need for SOPs, but did not set it as a priority until 
the second quarter of FY 2008.  Once set, a list was compiled reflecting topic 
areas requiring SOPs.  Those charged with developing the SOPs requested 
management prioritize the list to ensure the effort was in line with the 
expectations and current priorities of the command.  No response was received.  
The team proceeded working on what they considered a priority using their 
experience at USACC-KU. 
The Support Division Chief tracked progress of the SOPs and presented 
their status at the weekly staff meeting.  Personnel changes left one individual to 
work SOP development while also reviewing each contract action exceeding 
$100,000.  Each action required a completed review within 24 hours, which 
unofficially made the reviews the priority.  SOPs fell in priority.  As of May 10, 
2008, one SOP was signed and released by the commander; “KU-SOP-0001 
entitled, Development, Approval, Release and Control of SOPs.”23  Employees 
and middle managers sought local guidance to assist in their daily tasks.  One 
respondent stated to be successful, USACC-KU needs “Established procedures 
                                            
23 ACC-KU In-Brief slides, Slide 23. 
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for the process of contract award.  Command is making a lot of progress in this 
area.”  Based on this statement, the researcher assumes effort to develop SOPs 
again became a priority.   
To assist with contract quality oversight, an internal review process 
providing quality assurance of contract documents began on all contract actions 
exceeding $100,000.  The applicable files are reviewed by the below in the 
following order: 
1. Contracting Officer 
2. Procurement Analyst 
3. Attorney-advisor 
4. Chief, Contract Operations    
For actions exceeding $500,000, the above process remains with the addition of: 
5. Commander, USACC-KU 
6. Deputy PARC 
This process was implemented via an email from the Deputy PARC to the 
USACC-KU commander in March 2008.  The email was not distributed 
throughout the command; the direction was filtered by word-of-mouth. 
In addition to awarding contracts and issuing policy, the command is also 
responsible for the Government Purchase Card (GPC) Program in Kuwait.  Each 
Army operational contracting office supporting a program has an Agency/ 
Organization Program Coordinator (A/OPC) who oversees the program.  They 
are responsible for training program participants, ensuring annual training 
requirements are met, establishing and managing individual cardholder accounts 
and appointing the account certifiers (referred to as Billing Officials (BOs) in the 
Army), conducting annual inspections on one hundred percent of all BO accounts 
and providing results to the unit’s chain of command, and addressing questions 
posed by customers.  In August 2007, the size of the program was close to four 
hundred accounts, but by April 2008, they had reduced the amount of accounts 
to just over 180.  Although the daily tasks remain regardless of the size of the 
program, the smaller the program, the less oversight required.  
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Guidance for overseeing the program is formalized in the Department of 
Defense Charge Card Guidebook for establishing and Managing Purchase, 
Travel, and Fuel Card Programs, dated August 19, 2008, and Army Regulation 
715-xx (working draft), dated March 2006.  The Director of the Joint Program 
Management Office for the GPC issues policy memorandums when necessary, 
which are often times, supplemented by the Army proponent responsible for the 
program – Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement).  In the middle 
of FY 2008, the 408th CSB commander issued a regional SOP applicable to both 
the contracting office in Kuwait and Qatar.  No implementing guidance was 
issued locally; commander determined the brigade level SOP was sufficient.   
When the command was responsible for the base operations contract for 
all installations in Kuwait populated with U.S. military personnel, USACC-KU 
provided property administration services for the Government owned property 
being utilized by the contractor.  Responsibility for ensuring the Government 
property was on the property books and hand receipted to the contractor 
belonged to the command.  If problems occurred with the property, they 
coordinated the repair or replacement and ensured accuracy and completeness 
of the Government records.  With the transfer of the base operations contract, 
there was no longer a need for a property administrator within the command.  
The person filling the position retired in the second quarter of FY 2008 and the 
position was removed from the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). 
With the automated contract writing system and other information 
technology requirements in the command, the organization is responsible for 
keeping the systems updated, functioning, and usable by the staff.  They must 
appoint information management officers to coordinate with the local information 
management staff at ASG-KU for any firewall or other issues involving the local 
computer network.  Along with technical experts to keep the system operating, a 
functional system administrator is on board to assist users with questions and 
concerns regarding the operation of the contract writing system.  The contractor 
who developed the contract writing system provides technical support to 
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command designated representatives and supplies a website for additional 
information.  The Army established a group of technical experts at Fort Lee, VA, 
to assist in the majority of e-business solutions supporting the acquisition 
workforce.  Available on their website is a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that 
provides guidance on the Army’s implementation of the system.  USACC-KU has 
not issued any local supplement or written guidance.  However, the Joint 
Program Management Office responsible for the contract writing system provides 
regular formalized guidance regarding system problems, upgrades, and 
frequently asked questions.   
USACC-KU has an established Quality Assurance (QA) branch.  When 
the massive base operations contract was the responsibility of the command, 
their role consisted of overseeing the contractor performing the services along 
with representatives from the units.  The tasks were formalized by requirements 
in the contract, the FAR, and its supplements.  The basic job morphed into 
developing and overseeing the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) 
program for Kuwait.  Local training courses are now developed and taught by the 
command, internal SOPs implementing and outlining the requirements are 
complete, the QA personnel provide on-the-job assistance, and are tracking COR 
data and monitoring COR performance.  Results of any reviews are provided to 
the contracting officer and the COR’s unit.  In July 2007, approximately twenty-
five percent of service contracts had trained and appointed CORs.  By  October 
1, 2007, over 345 students completed the local COR training and by May 1, 
2008, 100 percent of all service contracts requiring a COR had appointed and 
trained CORs performing QA.24 
As with most organizations, administrative tasks are necessary to keep 
the unit functioning.  Civilian personnel actions are processed, arriving and 
departing employees are provided in and out processing checklists, payroll 
information is submitted up the chain of command, training requirements 
                                            
24 USARCENT Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Program briefing slides, Slide 13, 
Mr. David Yelton, May 18, 2008. 
 31
monitored, and leave and other benefits are tracked.  Aside from this type of 
administrative support, tasks include entering the Purchase Request and 
Commitment (Department of the Army Form 3953) data into the contract writing 
system.  Coordination is made with customers when the form contained errors or 
if necessary information is not included.  Although the contracting command’s 
primary job is to award contracts, a myriad of tasks are required to allow the 
organization to function on its mission. 
2. People 
The OSF model design factor, people, describes the number and types  of  
personnel in the organization, including their expectations, motivations, and 
mindsets, as well as their knowledge, skill sets, and abilities.  This data assists in 
analyzing the organization and any intended or unintended consequences that 
may occur when inputs are being processed into results. The people of USACC-
KU are described below using this criteria.   
As of February 2007, the command was authorized 29 positions.  Twenty-
four of the positions were filled and an additional eight personnel augmented the 
staff.  Augmentees included staff from the TSC, the PARC’s office, and the Joint 
Manning Document (JMD).  The JMD contains a specified amount of slots filled 
by other services.  It reflects one Navy O-4 and two Air Force O-3 positions for 
USACC-KU.  When workload was exceeding the capabilities of the staff, the 
commander at the time, submitted a requirement for Contract Specialist 
contractor personnel to a contracting center in the U.S.  The center awarded a 
Task Order for up to 15 contractor personnel.  Currently, USACC-KU is operating 
with all 15 on board. 
In May 2008, leadership at USACC-KU released a proposed TDA of 44 
personnel (six military and 38 Army civilians) for approval through their chain of 
command.  They were functioning with two military, 21 Army civilians and 28 
augmentees.  Augmentees included 15 contractor personnel, three personnel 
filling the JMD positions, and numerous military and civilian personnel on 
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Temporary Duty (TDY) or Temporary Change of Station (TCS).  Official status of 
the request for an increased TDA is unknown by the researcher.  
Considering the mix of military (from different services), civilian 
employees, and contractor personnel, there is a myriad of motivations, 
expectations, and mindsets amongst the staff.  Most often, the military are 
selected for deployment and probably did not chose the location.  Once in 
USACC-KU, repairing the damage done to the command by their predecessors 
likely motivated most military members.  They also wished to support the troops 
in the field, as most had once been in the field themselves.  For civilian and 
contractor personnel, some may be motivated by the increased pay for working 
in a declared combat zone.  Army civilian employees who are TDY are entitled 
Danger Pay and Post Differential, each equal to 15 percent of their base pay.  
Additionally, most are offered a temporary promotion if they agree to deploy.  
Depending on the length of the tour and their efforts, they may receive an 
incentive award (a.k.a. bonus) of $2,000 to $5,000.25  Those who accept 
permanent positions (meaning permanent change of station/PSC) or TSC 
receive the aforementioned pay increases as well as a Post Allowance of twenty 
percent of their base pay and possibly a Separate Maintenance Allowance.  
Based on the number of dependents, SMA could range from $4,300 to $17,700 
annually.26  Often times, USACC-KU offers a recruitment bonus of twenty 
percent of the base pay if the selectee agrees to stay for one year.  Some 
additional non-monetary incentives were available such as: 
• Government leased apartment for PCS personnel; 
• Government leased vehicle and fuel at no charge; 
• Government leased cellular telephone; 
• Free meals at the Government dining facilities; 
• Overtime and/or compensatory time; and/or 
                                            
25 Information Paper, subj: Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia Contracting Command 




• Rest and Relaxation tour (round trip airfare paid). 
The additional compensation (entitlements and bonuses) and non-
monetary benefits listed above are incentives offered by the Army that may 
motivate civilian personnel to apply, accept and possibly extend their positions at 
USACC-KU.  
Others may be motivated by the sense of adventure, wanting to assist in 
the “clean up” of an in-trouble organization, or to have an increased sense of 
“supporting the troops” by being closer to the action.  Another possibility is the 
upward mobility potential in the command.  With the high turnover rate and 
recruiting challenges, promotion potential exists at a faster rate than contracting 
organizations in non-combat zones.   
Contractor personnel may be motivated by similar reasons.  Based on the 
negotiated contract, the contractor included similar benefits and incentives in 
their price proposal to include a $20,000 bonus after completing a year in Kuwait.  
Many of the contractor personnel are either retired military or military that left the 
service after their commitment ended.  They may be motivated by the financial 
opportunities, but possibly by no longer being in leadership roles.  Contractor 
employees cannot be warranted as a contracting officer and therefore, are no 
longer the final decision makers.  The government representative retains that 
responsibility. 
The capabilities of military personnel at the command vary.  The Army has 
determined they will no longer deploy an acquisition officer (in the series of 51C) 
unless they have at least one year of experience.  However, this is a recent 
decision so in prior years, many could have rotated through the command with 
little or no operational experience in contracting.  Even if they have a year of 
experience, it may not be the specialized experience necessary in Kuwait.  The 
Navy traditionally sends a Supply Corps officer, but their training differs from the 
Army.  They are not solely dedicated to contracting; they have more of a general 
logistics focus.  The Air Force (AF) starts their acquisition personnel in 
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contracting where they usually remain throughout their career.  There are 
different types of contracting supported by the AF, from base or installation level 
contracting to systems development contracting.  Therefore, the military positions 
at USACC-KU may not always be filled by those with the necessary base level 
experience. 
Army civilian personnel within the command have mixed capabilities as 
well.  It is difficult to recruit people to serve at Camp Arifjan.  There are only two 
“command sponsored” positions within the organization which allow spouses 
and/or children to accompany the employee.  This is a deterrent for many with 
the right skill set and experience.  There are instances where contract specialists 
accepted PSC positions in the command immediately after graduating from an 
internship program, which reflects their limited experience. 
3. Structure 
In the OSF model, structure refers to basic groupings of activities and 
people, how the activities are combined or departmentalized, and how groupings 
are integrated.  Also considered, are the integrating devices used such as 
hierarchy, task forces, matrix or network type of arrangements.  At USACC-KU, 
the structure is influenced by the commander and, therefore, may vary with the 
change of leadership.  In February 2007, the commander at the time grouped the 
staff into three major divisions: 
1) Procurement; 
2) Combat Services Support Contract – Kuwait, which oversaw the 
base operations contracts; and  
3) Contract Support (overseen by the Deputy Commander; Army O-4).   
The Procurement Division consisted of four sub-groupings based on the 
types of funding used for the requirement (either Operation Iraqi Freedom or 
Defense Cooperative Agreement) along with the types of items or services being 
purchased.  A separate grouping was established for those supporting U.S. 
Embassy operations (OMC-K) in Kuwait.  Figure 6 is the Organization Chart from 
February 2007: 
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Figure 6.   Organization Chart27 
 
                                            
27 HQDA Contract Operations Review Team In-Brief, ACC-KU, Slide 7, April 9, 2008. 
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The current commander has proposed a different structure for his 
command.  Three major divisions remain, but they are divided into: 
1) Procurement Division; 
2) Support Division; and 
3) Contract Administration Division 
As shown in Figure 7 below, there is also a grouping entitled “Command 
Group” consisting of the Commander and the Deputy to the Commander. 
Reporting directly to the group is the legal support staff.  Although not shown in 
the proposed TDA structure below, the Command Group would also include the 
Navy O-4 currently acting as the Executive Officer.  The Support Division no 
longer includes only contract support.  It reflects support for the entire 
organization as it includes IT personnel, GPC program oversight, the QA 
functions, and a Supply Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO).  Additionally, 
procurement reviews, data analysis and personnel functions are part of this 
grouping.  The Procurement Division is now subdivided into a service and a 
supply branch as well as one for simplified acquisitions.  A new Contract 






Figure 7.   Proposed Organization Chart28 
 
 
                                            
28 HQDA Contract Operations Review Team In-Brief, ACC-KU, Slide 8. 
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Although distinct branches exist for services and supplies, often times 
work will shift between the branches based on the quantity of requirements being 
processed, personnel availability, and complexity of the workload.  Supplies or 
services may be a division’s primary focus, but the Contract Operations Chief 
has the latitude to spread the work amongst the available staff integrating their 
roles.  Neither are “stove piped” into procuring only those types of items 
specifically.  However, the Support Division is the opposite.  Each branch within 
the division has its own separate function; therefore, roles are not integrated 
within the division.  For example, those responsible for the GPC program are not 
usually cross trained in processing personnel actions, they are completely 
autonomous.  
The current command conducts a weekly staff meeting with leadership 
from each division to discuss the major events from the past week in each of 
their areas, priorities for the current week, and any issue that may require CSB 
involvement.  This group receives input from their divisions and relays back any 
pertinent information to their staff.  
The hierarchy in the command is reflective of what is typical in most Army 
contracting organizations.  It begins with employees and ends with the 
commander as outlined below: 
1. Employees 
2. Team Leader or Contracting Officer 
3. Division or Operations Chief 
4. Deputy to the Commander 
5. Commander 
4. Technology 
The technology factor in the throughput process refers to the workflow in 




flow, any interdependencies among the work units or activities involved in the 
work flow, and the condition of the physical facilities and equipment used by the 
organization.   
The work flow is somewhat standardized for the organization’s basic task 
of awarding contracts.  The customer must provide a thorough description of the 
item(s) or service(s) requested via a purchase request.  Through market 
research, they may provide make and model numbers of supplies meeting the 
government’s minimum requirements and include its salient characteristics, or a 
Performance Work Statement indicating what the government’s needs.  The 
contracting officer (KO) then determines method of solicitation, e.g., Request for 
Quote, Request for Proposal, Invitation to Bid or perhaps via an oral solicitation. 
All methods are allowable in the FAR depending on dollar limits and if supporting 
contingencies, etc.  The next step is to evaluate the responses received by the 
private sector – via either formal or informal source selection procedures.  The 
contractor best meeting the requirements outlined in the solicitation will then be 
awarded a contract by a warranted KO.  Variations exist in the detailed steps of 
the acquisition process depending on dollar amount, complexity, solicitation 
methodology, etc., but the overarching steps of the process remain. 
This portion of the acquisition process work flow can be described as 
having sequential interdependence since the major tasks are done in sequence; 
meaning one task must be completed before the next can be completed.  For 
example, solicitation cannot be prepared without a requirement from a customer, 
and a contract cannot be awarded without a solicitation, regardless of method 
selected.  Coordination and communication are necessary to complete the tasks 
and ensure proper timing of each major step to stay within the acquisition 
milestones.  
The contracting work flow process is automated throughout the 
Department of Defense with the implementation of the Standard Procurement 
System.  The contract writing portion of the system is called Procurement 
Desktop Defense, commonly referred to as PD2.  Solicitations, contract awards, 
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and associated supporting documents can be created and processed within PD2.  
Additionally, the functionality allows the documents to be converted to Microsoft 
Word, allowing electronic mail distribution to all parties involved in the process, 
e.g., Resource Managers, contractors, customers, etc.  Access is granted to all 
necessary command personnel allowing easy workload management for KOs. 
Workload is easily shifted amongst contracting personnel in the system and 
allows for tracking of who is assigned the project as well as its status.   
PD2 does not track all information required for leadership of a contracting 
office to receive a true snapshot of the productivity or health of the organization.  
By not tracking workload (manually or electronically), leadership was incapable of 
identifying workload or status of actions in their organization.  Contracts were not 
assigned to individuals for contract administration.  Therefore, little to no 
oversight of contract performance occurred until customers or contractors raised 
an issue.  Therefore, through the hiring of an expert in data management, the 
organization implemented the use of Microsoft Access as a tool to manage 
information.  Some items tracked are:  1) status of purchase requests/ 
requirements in the command (to include KO responsible); 2) expiring contracts; 
and 3) appointment of Contracting Officer’s Representatives (required for the 
majority of service contracts to ensure contractor performance is within the terms 
and conditions of the contract).  This information management tool assists 
leadership by extracting a report to reflect a current snapshot of the workload and 
productivity of the contract operations portion of the organization.  
USACC-KU utilizes the Army’s Business Intelligence (BI) system designed 
to extract data from a variety of existing systems, to include PD2, to track 
productivity.  A report is generated every Friday reflecting the number of contract 
actions completed, their respective dollar amounts, and if the required Contract 
Action Report (CAR) is completed.  Each contract action within DoD is to be 
reported via a CAR reflecting certain data of interest to higher echelons within the 
Department.  It includes information such as the use of socio-economic 
programs, actions awarded in support of contingencies, and other acquisition 
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specific information.  The information is extracted from BI gathered by 
Procurement Analysts, massaged into a format presentable for leadership, and 
incorporated into formal slides for the PARC staff.  A structure for this workflow is 
outlined in a SOP to ensure consistency in the process. 
For USACC-KU, an effective means of communication is essential for 
ensuring accurate, complete, and timely contracts to ensure the best support for 
the warfighter.  Whether it is telephonic, electronic mail, video teleconference, or 
facsimile, a method must exist for the unit to be operational.  Proper use of 
technology can improve daily operations, communications, and planning and 
control of the organization.  The command is equipped with the necessary 
physical equipment to succeed, such as:  operational printers, copiers, facsimile 
machines, document scanners, voice and electronic mail, and Internet access.  
Internet access can be challenging sometimes based on the tight firewalls and 
other network protection tools implemented by the information technology 
personnel at ASG-KU.   
USACC-KU is operating from Building T-346 on Camp Arifjan. It is a two-
story, temporary structure erected by ASG-KU to house contracting operations 
for Kuwait (see Figure 8).  With the growing size of contract requirements, the 
number of personnel required to support the workload grew as well.  On average, 
four personnel are squeezed into an area typically designed for no more than 
two, allowing for approximately two feet between some of the work areas.  
Division chiefs share a space with non-supervisory personnel, the Executive 
Officers work in shared spaces with contractor personnel, and Contract 
Specialists use unoccupied desk space in the attorney-advisor’s office area.  For 
some time, the command has also occupied space in Building 216, ASG-KU 
headquarters.  Previously, it consisted of those overseeing the base operations 
contract and some random other positions.  The footprint is shrinking in Building 




contracting shop stands a building away from the main office.  Building T-344 
houses personnel previously sitting in Building 216 and T-346 and was fully 
occupied by the end of June 2008. 
Figure 8.   USACC-KU main building (T-346)29 
 
  
Working in a “temporary” structure at Camp Arifjan, includes the lack of 
indoor plumbing.  Two separate temporary structures stand across the street 
from both buildings T-346 and T-344; the men’s and women’s latrine.  These 
facilities are shared with other organizations, third country nationals working on 
custodial and base maintenance contracts, and anyone else traveling the road in 
front of the buildings resulting in a lack of privacy. 
                                            
29 Photograph taken by researcher while serving in Kuwait. 
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5. Processes/Subsystems 
The last factor in the throughputs portion of the OSF model are the 
essential processes or subsystems in the organization that help manage, control, 
and run daily operations and plan for effective and efficient long term success.  
The OSF breaks down the processes into sub-factors of: 
• Financial Management, Measurement and Controls – Includes 
howpeople are held accountable for resources; describes 
budgeting, controls, performance measurement, and performance 
appraisal processes; 
• Human Resource Management – Addresses recruitment, 
selection,retention, termination, and/or retirement; whether the right 
people are on board; adequacy of training and development; and 
reward programs; and 
• Communication Information Planning and Decision Making Includes 
planning; how information is gathered, processed and distributed; 
how the organization communicates and how decisions are made. 
a. Financial Management  
The majority of financial management for USACC-KU is handled by 
its higher headquarters.  The budget is based on the number of authorized 
positions in the TDA along with a certain amount per person for basic supplies 
and travel needs.  Due to the mission and geographical location of the command, 
various monies fund the command: Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Defense 
Cooperative Agreement (agreement signed between the Kuwaiti and American 
governments at the end of the first gulf war for mutual assistance).30   Since 
Kuwait contracting became a top priority for the Secretary of the Army (based on 
the its past fraud and corruption), the command has not experienced problems 
when requesting additional funds for overhires, augmentees, or contractor 
support personnel.  All resources are used in an effort to eliminate fraud, improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the command.   
                                            
30 Information gained by researcher in discussions with USACC-KU leadership. 
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Performance of the organization can be measured by the number 
of actions processed in PD2 for specific periods.  The aforementioned BI system 
will extract actions and dollar amounts of those actions and import into an Excel 
format allowing for data to be manipulated and analyzed.  Typically, this is the 
type of metrics gathered when assessing the production in a contracting 
organization. However, this data does not reflect all workload performed by the 
organization.  Information on contract administration, document reviews, 
customer assistance, policy development, market research, GPC accounts 
created, etc., is not included in the data extraction tool.  Therefore, the data being 
captured by the command is only one of many performance metrics involved in a 
contracting organization.   
b. Human Resource (HR) Management  
Personnel management is an essential, valuable, and expensive 
resource to manage for the organization.  HR processes and procedures outlined 
in federal, DoD, and Department of the Army (DA) personnel rules and 
regulations assist in management of this resource.  USACC-KU organizational 
structure includes a Workforce Management Specialist responsible for the 
processing of required information and paperwork to recruit and select its civilian 
personnel.  However, the staffing strategy and planning remain in the hands of 
management.   
As mentioned previously, the command is comprised of a mix of 
personnel, e.g., military, contractor personnel, and the majority being Department 
of the Army civilian employees.  Recruitment, selection, and retention of each 
type of employee are distinctly different.  The Office of Personnel Management 
and the Army Civilian Personnel System rules, procedures, and regulations 
govern the recruitment of Army Civilian Corps members.  USACC-KU follows the 
established personnel guidelines when selecting or promoting personnel.   
Incentives are offered to attract qualified personnel to work in 
Kuwait.  As mentioned in the design sub-factor People outlined above, several 
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other monetary benefits are included in entitlement packages.  They are in line 
with State Department entitlements for the area: 1) Danger Pay & Post 
Differential at fifteen percent of base pay; 2) Post Allowance at twenty percent; 3) 
Separate Maintenance Allowance that can range from $4,300 to $17,700 based 
on the amount of dependants; and 4) the opportunity to work plenty of overtime 
hours substantially impacting one’s paycheck.  As previously mentioned, several 
other non-monetary benefits are included for those accepting a permanent 
position (via a PCS).  They range from a government provided vehicle and 
gasoline to free meals at the military dining facilities.   
Military personnel are assigned by branch managers, if filling a 
PSC position, or through the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS) 
for TDY assignments at USACC-KU.  The commander receives a copy of the 
soldier’s Officer or Enlisted Record Brief and will approve or disapprove their 
selection.  Aside from the traditional hiring process for permanent positions, 
WIAS is the primary method for requesting military and civilian augmentation for 
contingency operations, recurring operations and exercises. WIAS is a web-
based information system providing real-time information on current Army-wide 
Individual Augmentee (IA) requirements as well as the deployment status of 
personnel assigned to those requirements. The process consists of the following 
steps:  
1. Combatant command tasks component to fill a validated 
requirement.  
2. The Army component commander first attempts to source the 
requirement using internal assets.  
3. When the Army component command determines that the 
requirement cannot be filled using internal assets, the requirement 
is passed back to HQDA.  
4. HQDA analyzes the requirement and tasks the appropriate Major 
Army Command (MACOM) for fill.  
5. MACOM fills the requirement or reclamas the tasking to HQDA.  
6. In the event of a reclama, HQDA will task another MACOM or 
request 
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7. Joint Staff assistance to fill the requirement. Submission of a 
reclama for consideration does not constitute relief from the 
requirement. Once levied, the MACOM will continue to fill the 
position until officially relieved by HQDA.  
8. Civilian employees will be returned to their permanent jobs of 
record upon completion of their contingency assignments, unless 
the tasked MACOM and the employee mutually agree to other 
placement following the assignment.  
Although the Army has authority to mandate augmentations in 
support of contingencies, civilian employees may volunteer for Detail, Temporary 
Reassignment, or Temporary Promotion into positions that support contingency 
operations.  These positions will typically be of six months to one year in length 
with all expenses funded by the gaining command.  At the end of the assignment, 
employees will return to their permanent job of record.  The gaining and losing 
commands, with the employee's consent, can agree to a longer assignment or 
other placement of the employee following the assignment.31  
Many of the positions in the command filled with uniformed Army 
personnel are done so using WAIS.  The majority experience a 12 month 
deployment they may not have necessary volunteered for as inferred above.  As 
mentioned when discussing the People sub-factor, the command also has JMD 
slots filled by military personnel other than Army.  Usually, these deployments 
are six months in length.  Contractor employees are recruited and selected by 
the contractor’s human resources department.  According to the terms and 
conditions in the contract, the only role the government plays in their selection is 
approving “key personnel” which is the on-site manager.  Aside from that 
position, the government is to rely on the experience and qualification criteria 
they included in the Performance Work Statement.  Unofficially, the command’s 
management requested that those on the ground in Kuwait during the “corrupt” 
years, not be sent back to the region.  The contractor continues to oblige the 
request. 
                                            
31 Department of the Army Memorandum, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, subj: 
Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS), September 4, 2002. 
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As part of retention efforts, permanent party civilian personnel 
(those in Kuwait under Permanent Change of Station orders) usually receive an 
incentive award that is approximately twenty percent of their base pay.  They 
must agree to stay with the command for a minimum of one year.  If they later 
decide to return to their previous job or accept a position elsewhere, they would 
need to pay back the bonus.  Upon completion of a year, either the employee or 
the command may request an extension, but neither party is obligated.  The 
incentive package mentioned above may invite many to accept a position, but 
these benefits may motivate several to continue to work in the command beyond 
their initial commitment assisting with retention.   
There is no need for a retention plan in the command for military 
members since their personnel system is controlling their assignments.  
Additionally, the government cannot influence retention for contractor employees.  
However, according to contract documents, contract employees are offered a 
significant retention bonus for completing one year in Kuwait.  USACC-KU 
experiences a high turn over rate in personnel predominately based on its 
geographic location.  As of April 2008, the manning reflected a 48 percent 
vacancy rate of the TDA positions as indicated in Figure 9 below: 
Figure 9.   Staffing as of April 200832 
 TDA ON BOARD 
Military 6 2 
Dept of Army Civilians 38 21 
Total 44 23 
 
Promotions are primarily achieved through the same competitive 
process utilized for new hires.  All qualified applicants apply via an on-line civilian 
personnel system.  Job announcements are posted for a specified period of time 
                                            
32 HQDA Contract Operations Review Team In-Brief, ACC-KU, Slide 17. 
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inclusive of closing deadlines for applying.  Applicants meeting the 
predetermined qualifications are referred from CPAC to the selecting official at 
USACC-KU, usually the commander or deputy.  Resumes are reviewed and 
placed into a competitive range to conduct interviews.  Normally, the 
commander, deputy, and Deputy PARC conduct the interviews and make the 
selections.  Again, generally, the same process is followed for both new hires 
and promotions.  However, in the second quarter of FY 2008, the civilian 
personnel positions converted from a General Schedule pay scale to the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS).  This change impacts several facets of the 
personnel system to include promotions.  Instead of filling a position at a certain 
grade, it is a pay range.  This allows managers to move personnel around more 
freely within the range to meet the needs of the organization without waiting for 
the lengthy steps in the traditional personnel system to take place.  Therefore, 
some promotions may now be possibly filled without the competitive process. 
Included with the change to NSPS is the performance appraisal 
process.  The system is designed to increase effectiveness through a personnel 
management system that improves the way it hires and assigns, as well as 
compensates and rewards its employees by recruiting and motivating a high-
performance workforce with a truly merit based performance appraisal system.   
The evaluation system requires more documentation from the employee as well 
as the raters to substantiate the outcome.  Each command receives a “pay pool” 
from which annual appraisal funds are divided into shares.  An assigned board 
reviews appraisals and determines the amount of shares and increase in base 
pay for each employee in the pool.  NSPS is complex system that could be 
discussed much further in detail; however, it is not necessary for the purpose of 
this project.  The overarching point is the performance appraisal process is 
regulated and new at USACC-KU.  NSPS only applies to civilian personnel.   
The military appraisal system is adhered to at USACC-KU for all 
military personnel in the command.  Evaluation reports are required before 
military members leave the command.  Contractor support personnel are 
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evaluated by their leadership with little input on their performance from the 
government.  Those civilian personnel with the command under TDY or TCS 
status traditionally receive their annual appraisals at their home station with 
appraisal input from USACC-KU leadership.   
Training and career development is the next sub-factor in HR 
Management.  Operating in a contingency environment may not allow for time to 
develop and train employees.  However, USACC-KU established a training plan 
requiring biweekly training to be conducted every other Friday.  Topics vary 
based on the organization’s needs and are conducted from thirty to ninety 
minutes in length.  Training responsibility rotates amongst division chiefs, 
procurement analysts, attorney-advisors, and others depending on topic and 
local expertise.  While the researcher was working in the command, on-site 
training was provided by Defense Acquisition University for two acquisition 
topics: Simplified Acquisition Procedures and Source Selection.  This is not a 
regular occurrence due to the cost and effectiveness of the training given the 
location. 
The final sub-factor in HR Management is the rewards program, 
opportunities for advancement, compensation packages, and recognition.  The 
majority of these are covered in other portions of this description of USACC-KU. 
To recap: Basic compensation packages include increases in base pay for 
working in a declared combat zone, non-monetary benefits such as using 
government leased vehicles, fuel, and government leased apartments at no cost, 
and having meals provided at the government dining facilities for little or no fee. 
Bonuses are offered for PCS civilian personnel as an incentive to 
accept a position and commit to staying in Kuwait for one year.  Civilian 
employees under TDY or TCS orders may receive bonuses upon completion 
depending on length of service and performance.  Based on the structure of the 
organization and one’s current position, opportunities for advancement exist in 
the organization.  Even if it is not an advancement in rank or grade, a civilian 
employee can advance from serving in a contract specialist position to that of a 
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contracting officer.  The major difference between the two is the increased 
responsibility.  Only the contracting officer can sign contract award documents 
obligating the government to the terms and conditions outlined in the contract. 
A formal awards program does not exist at USACC-KU nor are 
there defined standards for awards issued by the command; however, both 
monetary and non-monetary awards are distributed to military and civilian 
personnel.  For the military, various levels of achievement medals, depending on 
the accomplishments of the individual, are awarded.  Often times they are 
accompanied with Certificates of Appreciation from the commander.  Civilians 
usually receive a Certificate of Appreciation along with a monetary incentive 
award after returning to home station. 
c. Communication Information Planning and Decision 
Making  
It is common knowledge that effective communication at all levels is 
essential to an organization’s success.  With the pace of working in a 
contingency environment, communication increases in importance, but may be 
inadequate due to time pressures.  USACC-KU leadership communicates 
through electronic mail and occasional “all hands” meetings.  Regular weekly 
staff meetings are held to maintain consistent communication between mid and 
senior management.  Occasionally, information discussed will be shared with 
those in the divisions, but not on a consistent basis.  Weekly meetings are 
conducted with contract operations personnel and resource managers outside of 
the organization to better assist in managing contract actions.   
Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, governs 
how Army staffs plan.  USACC-KU did not follow any formal planning process. 
The command operates in a reactive rather than proactive manner.  The same is 
true of decision-making:  no formal process to inform the commander, provide 
analysis and present courses of action is practiced.  The Military Decision Making 
Process (MDMP) is defined, step-by-step, in FM101-5.  The MDMP was not 
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utilized at USACC-KU.  Decisions were made without supporting, formal 
analysis.  When problems arose and a command decision was required, it took 
weeks to get a decision from the commander.           
C. RESULTS 
The results portion of the OSF model include the organization’s culture,  
outputs, and outcomes.   
1. Culture 
By applying the OSF model, the throughput or design factors, e.g., tasks, 
technology, structure, people, and processes, were used to describe the 
organization under study, USACC-KU.  The next portion of the model involves 
the culture of the organization.  Culture is “a pattern of beliefs and expectations 
shared by the organization’s members.  These beliefs and expectations produce 
norms that shape the behavior of individuals and groups.”33  Social norms are 
defined as "the rules that a group uses for appropriate and inappropriate values, 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviors.”34  Values are those characteristics of an 
organization held highly by its members. USACC-KU values and norms are 
expanded below.   
Conducting daily operations in a transparent, ethical manner is the 
governing norm at USACC-KU.  While none of the current employees worked 
with MAJ Cockerham in 2005, several were assigned to the command and met 
with the Secretary of the Army during his September 2007 visit.  His message 
was loud and clear:  ethical behavior is the cornerstone of rebuilding the 
reputation of USACC-KU and Army Contracting in general.  The commander 
emphasizes ethical behavior at every opportunity.  New arrivals receive a briefing 
on acquisition specific ethics and are retrained quarterly.  Contracting officers 
                                            
33 Excerpted from Charles O’Reilly, “Corporations, Culture, and Commitment: Motivation and 
Social Control in Organizations,” California Management Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1989, 289. 
34 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norm_(sociology). 
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thoroughly document the procurement process in contracting files demonstrating 
their fair and unbiased contract awards.  This norm is realized in the values and 
behaviors of the organization. 
USACC-KU members value contribution to rebuilding the command and 
restoring the command’s reputation.  The commander and managers value those 
who contribute for obvious reasons.  Employees also value those who contribute.  
They value their peers who work harder than others at rebuilding the command.  
This was often demonstrated when groups left the building for lunch or dinner at 
the dining facility.  High performers invite other high performers to join them, 
while not specifically inviting those who seem to contribute to a lesser degree.  
Contracting expertise is also valued.  A group of individuals with a high level of 
performance and contracting expertise resulted in an informal pattern of 
interaction at USACC-KU. 
As previously mentioned, there appeared to be little planning or strategy at 
USACC-KU.  An informal pattern of interaction filled the gap.  Those who 
performed and held contracting expertise formed a subculture at USACC-KU.  
This group of contracting officers, an attorney and a procurement analyst 
identified problems, analyzed possible courses of action and then engaged the 
commander for his approval of a solution to solve problems or develop 
acquisition strategies.  Skipping middle management in the chain of command is 
not the method prescribed in FM101-5, but actual behaviors which emerged over 
time. 
Other subcultures existed at USACC-KU.  One was known as the Texas 
Trio: three members of Defense Contract Management Agency, Dallas, who all 
volunteered to serve in Kuwait for one year.  Military officers have a unique 
culture which was prevalent at USACC-KU.  The commander occasionally 
conducted Officer Professional Development at his home.  This bonding time 
solidified the officer subculture.  The civilian employees who lived on the 
economy (off of Camp Arifjan) and those in TDY status that resided on camp 
represented two subcultures of Army civilians.  Those off base often socialized 
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during their limited time off work and experienced the local culture by visiting 
malls, eating at local restaurants, etc.  TDY personnel were only able to leave 
base for official business, with the commander’s approval.  The access to the 
local community, different living conditions and privileges contributed to the 
subculture formation.  The contracted employees were a subculture based on 
their professional similarities — most were former U.S. Air Force — but also their 
inability to perform certain functions that were “government only.”  Additionally, 
they shared vehicles and housing (no more than two per unit) and all worked the 
same schedule.  These subcultures resulted in occasional conflicts.  
Working in austere conditions at a high operational tempo, in a 
contingency environment, for eight to fifteen hours a day, six days a week, 
increases the potential for conflicts.  One instance of this was a conflict between 
an attorney and a contracting officer/team leader that occurred late at night when 
most had left for the day.  A verbal altercation resulted when, during a review, the 
attorney questioned the contracting officer’s approach and the contracting officer 
verbalized his contempt for the attorney’s lack of simplified acquisition 
experience.  Since one party was a military officer, it was raised to the military 
commander to resolve.  He did so quickly, via written counseling of both 
individuals.  The two apologized and the conflict was resolved.     
For civilians, the majority of conflicts were addressed by the Deputy to the 
Commander (GS-14 position).  Whether they were raised to an immediate 
supervisor initially or directly presented to the deputy, they ended up in his office 
for resolution.  Regardless of whether the commander or his deputy handled the 
conflict, it was resolved quickly as the organization appeared to focus on its 
mission.  
2. Outputs 
Outputs of a system are the goods and/or services produced by the 
organization.  It is important in the application of the OSF model to recognize 
how the outputs are measured and to identify the indicators of performance. The 
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outputs for USACC-KU include assistance in defining the customer’s 
requirements, business advisory services, e.g., acquisition planning, GPC 
program management, COR support, etc., and awarding and monitoring 
contracts for the goods and services necessary to sustain the primary logistics 
hub supporting OIF.  The outputs may be measured by the amount of time it 
takes to award a contract action – from the receipt of the purchase request (or 
requirement) to the signing of a contract award.  The number of actions and their 
dollar values are additional metrics of performance for USACC-KU.  These are 
used by the command to determine staffing needs, productivity, and 
effectiveness of the organization.  The quality of contracts written and 
administered is difficult to measure, but directly impact the warfighter and those 
providing support.  If performance lapses or if the items or services provided do 
not meet the customer’s requirements, the contracting office has failed to meet 
its mission and the warfighter suffers.   
USACC-KU’s primary measurement of performance for the GPC program, 
are the number of accounts (both Billing Official and Cardholder), amount 
delinquent, and the number of audits conducted.  In August 2007, USACC-KU 
supported 377 accounts.  Of those, eight inspections were complete and 
delinquencies totaled almost $800,000. These measurements prompted the 
command reassign different personnel into the A/OPC position and take action.  
By decreasing the number of accounts to a manageable amount for the program 
staffing (192 accounts), and changing the inspection method from hands-on to 
electronic, the outputs improved for the command.  By March 2008, 100% of all 
accounts were audited and the delinquencies totaled just over $4,000.  The 
outputs of the system caused management to refocus their efforts to the GPC 
program ensuring improved outputs for its customers.  
Post-award functions, referred to as contract administration, were virtually 
non-existent.  With the high personnel turn over rates, a workload that far 
outweighed the capabilities of the staff, and no tracking mechanism in place, 
oversight of the contractor’s performance or delivery suffered.  COR’s are 
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nominated by the customer’s organization to provide technical oversight of 
contractor performance and verify acceptance and completion of delivered items 
or services.  Some contracts had assigned CORs; some officially appointed and 
others merely performing the role with little formal training or experience.  This 
shortcoming in contract management was identified in expeditionary contracting 
across the region in the “Gansler Report” submitted to the Secretary of the Army 
in the fall of 2007. 
USACC-KU took a proactive step by developing a comprehensive COR 
training program to improve and enhance contract oversight.  The Quality 
Assurance Representatives (QAR) provide a three-day class covering 14 subject 
areas.  Training includes some practical exercises, group presentations, and an 
exam at the end of the course.35   On-the job technical assistance is then 
provided by the QARs.  They assist with COR file and documentation preparation 
and walking through the process on-site with the COR.  After three to four weeks 
of appointment, a performance assessment is conducted by the QAR to ensure 
adequate COR and contractor performance.36  Providing this level of training and 
support from USACC-KU, ensures proper contract management by the 
customer.  With the imbalance of workload and contracting personnel, reliance 
on COR oversight is imperative.  The success of this program spread throughout 
Kuwait and personnel at Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan are 
considering implementing a similar program for their customers.  In January 
2008, an article was posted on the Army web page regarding this new program 
and the annual savings to the Army gaining by two properly trained CORs in 
Kuwait.  Brigadier General James Hodge, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
(Forward) commanding general, was quoted emphasizing CORs are “…true 
stewards of the taxpayer’s money and [an] integral to the mission.”  Additionally, 
he stated, “With the increase in contractor support to our deployed forces, the  
 
                                            
35 USARCENT Slide 11. 
36 Ibid., Slide 21. 
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COR performs a vital role in the support of the war effort.”  Recognizing the need 
for improved COR training and performance, increases the quality of contract 
administration at USACC-KU. 
Indicators of performance or outputs of USACC-KU are reflected in a 
variety of ways depending on the function.  For contract support, it includes the 
quality of the written contracts and customer satisfaction – whether the soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines receiving the items or services requested, when and 
where needed, at the level or quantity required.  GPC program performance is 
determined by the amount of account inspections and delinquencies and the 
support provided to program participants.   
3. Outcomes 
Outcomes are the intended and unintended consequences of the outputs  
for the stakeholders to include how they are viewed.  USACC-KU stakeholders 
include:  1) taxpayers; 2) supported units commonly referred to as “warfighters;” 
3) USACC-KU members and their chain of command; and 4) contractors.  
USACC-KU outputs impact each group of stakeholders differently.  Taxpayers 
are affected by the amount of dollars utilized for contracted goods and services.  
If USACC-KU releases poor outputs/contracts, contract pricing may be inflated 
due to poor negotiations for example.  An unintended consequence is the waste 
or misuse of taxpayers’ dollars.  When/if this occurs and the taxpayers become 
aware of the situation; the American public loses confidence in Army acquisition 
capabilities.   
Warfighters are the primary customer of USACC-KU.  They are directly 
impacted by the quality of goods and services received via the procurement 
process.  If the contract is not written to adequately meet their requirement, their 
mission is impaired and their trust in USACC-KU is impacted.  If contract 
administration is poor and service contracts are allowed to lapse without a 
replacement contract, warfighters may go without support or the contractor may 
perform without a contract being in place.  Contract lapses occurred frequently in 
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USACC-KU until the start of FY08.  While service lapses were not life threatening, 
operating without life support services, such as bulk water delivery,  directly impact 
mission accomplishment and customer satisfaction.  Their satisfaction is imperative 
to the command and the Army. 
The outcomes for USACC-KU staff members include continued employment 
and job satisfaction.  Job satisfaction is a fluctuating, measurable consequence of 
the USACC-KU system.  High job satisfaction leads to better retention and eases the 
recruitment needs of the organization.  This was not the case at USACC-KU:  job 
satisfaction was low, retention was difficult and recruiting was extremely difficult.   
Contractors awarded contracts by USACC-KU are impacted financially by the 
outputs.  How USACC-KU conducts business, particularly if it is ethical or not, has a 
direct impact on contractors.  Fraud was a high visibility unintended consequence of 
contracting in Kuwait in 2005 (and possibly 2006).  Contractors noted the ethical 
behavior and conduct of business in 2007 and 2008.  On at least two occasions, 
contractors thanked members of USACC-KU for treating all contractors equitably 
and returning fairness to the contracting process.   
The outcomes of the USACC-KU system are measured by the support 
provided to its stakeholders; primarily the warfighters.  Customer satisfaction was 
low for several years.  Inadequate contracts and lack of oversight assistance 
contributed to the problem.  Customers were unable to gain access to the 
Contracting Officers working their requirements.  Instances occurred where 
telephone calls were unanswered and the customer access door at USACC-KU was 
locked before 1630 hours.37  Limited duty hours normally do not exist in a 
contingency environment for an organization supporting wartime operations.   
                                            
37 Information gained from discussions between the researcher and anonymous personnel 
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IV. SURVEY DATA 
Twenty-three current and prior USACC-KU personnel completed a survey 
(located at Attachment 1); 14 employees, seven middle managers and two senior 
managers.  Neither the commander, nor his deputy responded.  Interestingly, no 
contractors elected to respond although several were asked to participate.  A 
summary of respondents’ educational levels is provided below. 
 
Figure 10.   Education level of survey respondents38  
 
 
The mix of respondents included Army, Navy and Air Force military 
service members and DA Civilian employees.  Among the service members 
responding, the average experience in contracting was 6.75 years.  Responding 
civilians held nearly double the experience of their military co-workers with, on 
average, 13.14 years of experience.   
The length of time spent in USACC-KU at the time of responding was 8.44 
months on average.  This amount of time seems sufficient to formulate an 
assessment of USACC-KU.  Respondents average experience and education 
levels suggest they are well informed to provide reliable responses to the survey 
questions.  The number of respondents is not statistically significant at 23 and 
therefore the survey results have limited generalizability.  Survey results 
Education Level Number Of Respondents 
High School  Diploma 2 
Bachelor’s 4 
Master’s Courses 6 
Master’s 10 
Law Degree 1 
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considered in combination with the eight months of daily observations by the 
researcher formulate the basis of the conclusions related in the analysis portion 
of the thesis.      
 
                                            
38 Data compiled from survey responses. 
 61
V. ANALYSIS 
This chapter examines relative congruencies among OSF variables.  The 
overarching hypothesis of the systems model is that the “fit” of the variables 
determines performance including intended and unintended consequences of the 
outputs.  The researcher’s observations are used to inform the conclusions and 
recommendations, including data from the survey and interview discussions.   
The format of the analysis follows the format of the OSF, beginning with the 
inputs and ending with the results.  The OSF has now been populated with 
USACC-KU variables as shown in Figure 11. 
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The external environment in which USACC-KU functions, the harsh desert 
surrounding, being in a war zone and interacting with the Arab culture of Kuwait 
in particular, is not a good fit for a typical CONUS contracting organization.  
Desert temperatures and dust keep people inside.  Living in a war zone restricts 
personal freedom to travel.  None of the members of USACC-KU are Arab 
making them obvious standouts anytime they attempt to travel or conduct 
business in Kuwait City.  The external environment resulted in workers who 
would “…drive to work and work all day, then drive home and never leave their 
apartments.”39  One employee described the situation in a single word on his 
survey, “confining.”40  In fact, Camp Arifjan, where USACC-KU is located, is 
commonly referred to as Camp “Arifjail.”   
A recommendation is for USACC-KU leadership to attempt to alleviate the 
confining feeling of this environment.  Doing so, based on all observation and 
survey results, could markedly improve morale productivity.  Although not easy to 
orchestrate, if the command organized events bringing members into greater 
contact with the Arab and Kuwait community, over time, the gap between 
cultures may lessen, and employees would be markedly stimulated through 
some experience with the local culture.  The 3rd Army Commander authorizes 
MWR trips in Kuwait, but the command could find ways to enrich and further 
support these important work breaks.  Qatar offers a four-day pass rest and 
recuperation site for soldiers from Kuwait, and there are other locations geared  
towards alleviating the persistent restlessness associated with confined 
personnel.  This program was used only one time by two individuals during the 
time the researcher was assigned to USACC-KU.  Their participation in the Qatar 
                                            
39 Survey response from Anonymous Source #13, Employee. 
40 Ibid., #14. 
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program was ordered by the BDE CDR and supported by USACC-KU leadership.  
The point is that this program could be embellished and leveraged to ensure 
employees have a vehicle to enrich their overseas experience.  Purposeful 
contact with the local culture would also appear to be part of a recipe for winning 
hearts and minds and improving overall performance.    
2. Key Success Factors  
Of all the USACC-KU key success factors, the most important may be the 
careful selection of deployed personnel.  Each employee could be vetted to 
ensure a better fit with the difficult environmental conditions and with the internal 
skill requirements need to execute Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) to 
award contracts complying with applicable procurement regulations.  It is 
possible to ensure that participating employees are informed, capable, trained 
and rewarded for working extended hours in an austere environment.  A misfit 
between personnel and the conditions described throughout this study would 
predict degraded performance.  In January 2008, the USACC-KU hired an 
attorney-advisor who had no experience with SAP contracting.  In May 2008, a 
Procurement Analyst with no SAP exposure was hired.  These are two critical 
personnel who make up two of the three layers of contract review for most SAP 
contracts.  The impact of the hiring problem was recognized by a  survey 
respondent who said, “It was my impression that the work force spent more man 
hours fixing problems created by inexperienced personnel…”41 than on normal 
effort.  Interviewed employees, and middle and senior managers almost all 
indicated that more qualified personnel are needed for the command to be 
successful.  Therefore, leadership attention at the crucial nexus of hiring and 
deploying civilian specialists could yield dramatic improvements in generating 
intended results.  Existing hiring incentives can be strengthened and designed to 
attract and retain the right people.  One survey respondent stated, “TDY 
                                            
41 Survey response from Anonymous Source #6, Middle Management. 
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personnel [are] promised cash awards, [but they are] not given…”.42  Whether 
real or perceived, this statement summarizes the existing gap and inattention to 
this important detail.  USACC-KU can request support and command emphasis 
from the newly formed Army Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting 
Command and Mission and Installation Contracting Command to assist them in 
managing the process of selecting “the right people” in Kuwait.  All of these 
commands are headed by General Officer’s or civilian equivalents that come in 
contact with and influence many people daily.  USACC-KU could develop and 
execute a recruiting road show.  They could visit other contracting offices and 
discuss lessons learned regarding “rebuilding” USACC-KU.  If personnel do not 
better fit the environment in which they work, degraded performance can be 
anticipated.    
3. System Direction 
The USACC-KU lacked strategic direction, goals and strategies.  Reacting 
to events and operating based on the hot issue of the day set by the PARC or the 
commander translates into low leverage.  There was a misfit between the crucial 
variable of planning and daily operations, leading to an ad hoc method of 
governance.  One employee stated, “Command direction was determined on a 
day to day basis in accordance with the emergency of the day and [was] 
communicated via email and hey you meetings.”43  Another employee stated, “It 
appeared the direction was changing almost daily, depending upon who was 
looking at the command from above.”44  A third employee indicated, “The 
command knew what needed to be done but did not know how or where to start.  
This led to confusion among the rank and file, one question and ten different  
 
                                            
42 Survey response from Anonymous Source #9, Employee. 
43 Ibid., #2. 
44 Ibid., #1. 
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answers.”45  Middle management agreed, “My experience has shown that the 
directions are scattered.  Almost equivalent to watching a moth in a jar and trying 
to predict his next move.”46  
To rectify the planning gap, a recommendation is to have a team of 
managers and employees develop goals to which they can relate and be 
committed to, including the use of milestones and performance metrics.  The 
planning process and deliverables can then be communicated throughout the 
command increasing the probability of goals accomplishment.  Although reacting 
to expected disruptions and contingencies is a normal part of the job, leader-led 
planning and employee involvement are needed to close this crucial gap.  Goals 
can definitely be used both to guide and motivate performance, including process 
to reward accomplishment. 
B. THROUGHPUTS 
The next element of the OSF model are the design factors or the 
throughputs (tasks/jobs, people, technology, structure, and processes/ 
subsystems).  Each of this is discussed below.   
1. Tasks  
The task of developing and documenting SOPs was recognized as critical 
to the success of USACC-KU in 2007.  An organization with high personnel turn 
over definitely requires complete, updated and documented processes and 
standards.  In response to the question “To be successful, USACC-KU needs…”, 
one mid-level manager said, “Established procedures for the process of contract 
award.  Command is making a lot of progress in this area.”47  With two 
Procurement Analysts (PA) working in the Support Division, the command could 
dedicate one individual to writing policy and procedures for the command.  Upon 
                                            
45 Survey response from Anonymous Source #6, Employee. 
46 Ibid., #7, Middle Management. 
47 Ibid., #4. 
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approval and release of a policy document, the PA could then conduct required 
training to ensure consistency with published procedures.  Training is an 
important variable which again must fit the environment to achieve desired 
results.  Therefore, the training can be designed and supported such that 
employees view it as a positive aspect of their jobs, not as punishment.  
Meaningful, professional training can serve the dual purpose of providing another 
means whereby interacting employees can better cope with their austere working 
environment.  Once performance metric could include random sampling of 
contract actions below the review threshold to ensure implementation and 
consistency across the command.  
2. People 
Maximizing the individual potential of employees is linked to knowing what 
motivates them.  According to the responses received from employee surveys, 
the most common motivator at USACC-KU is contributing to the war on terrorism.  
According to an article on motivation at the work place, “Motivation reaches a 
peak when your personal goals and mission align with the specific demands of 
your work and the objectives of your organization….You see concrete results. 
You feel a strong sense of inner purpose. This is what true motivation feels like 
and it can come only from within.”48  The command can leverage employees 
desires to contribute to the war on terrorism as a motivational tool.  This could be 
achieved by developing a meaningful reward system whereby outstanding 
employees are recognized for their accomplishments in supporting the war effort.  
A photo of a happy employee being recognized can go a long way, i.e., intrinsic 
motivation matters.  In 2008 a KO awarded a contract for steel to armor vehicles 
used in convoys going in and out of Iraq in an abbreviated fashion by pre-
qualifying offerors.  He accompanied the customer to the steel provider facilities 
and guided the certifications.  The KO then quickly executed the solicitation and 
                                            
48 Anne Smith and Gordon Cul, “Motivation: What Works, What Doesn't,” 
www.coxegroup.com/articles/motivation.html, accessed September 17, 2008. 
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made an effective, compliant contract award.  This is an example of an action 
worthy of special recognition by a systematic program.   
Additionally, linking what USACC-KU does to concrete results may 
increase motivation.   Leadership could arrange a tour of the 3rd Army tactical 
operations center located on Camp Arifjan.  This impressive facility with two story 
walls of computer monitors and televisions with real time video from across Iraq 
and Kuwait is impressive and motivating.  USACC-KU bought these screens and 
provides replacement parts on an on going basis via contract.  Another 
opportunity on Camp Arifjan relatively easy to coordinate would be a tour of 
HMMWVs used during convoy escorts, accompanied by a meal with the soldiers 
who drive them.  USACC-KU contracts for the soldier’s food preparation, 
showers, living quarter maintenance and even the water they drink.  These 
efforts to energize a sense of purpose and patriotism could be powerful 
motivators which could yield marked improvements in performance.     
3. Structure 
The proposed structure in Figure 6 above is similar to Army contracting 
offices in the late 1990s.  Having a separate Procurement and Contract 
Administration Division (a.k.a. Pre and Post-award) is no longer the norm.  Most 
contracting offices transitioned to “cradle to grave” contracting where an 
individual or team is responsible for the entire process, e.g., from purchase 
request to contract closeout.  This promotes the use of contracting personnel as 
business advisors for their customers.  Relationships are established during the 
development of the requirement through the solicitation phase and on to final 
delivery or performance completion of the contract.  It enhances the contract 
professional’s familiarity and understanding of the item or service being 
purchased.  Once awarded, the same individual or team continues by 




conditions of the contract they wrote.  Seeing a contract to completion creates a 
sense of ownership, once again leveraging an intrinsic factor to attain enriched 
performance. 
Keeping the award and administration functions separate results in an “us 
versus them” mentality within an organization.  Procurement Division (Preaward) 
personnel thought regardless of what they did, the Contract Administration 
Division (Postaward) would modify the contract to correct any deficiencies, so 
preaward personnel sometimes became less attentive to detail.  Likewise, the 
postaward team determined they had to fix or modify the contract upon receipt 
due to the inabilities of the preaward personnel.    
When the researcher departed USACC-KU, the divisions were not 
operating as proposed.  Contract Administration Division members were not 
administering contracts.  Instead, they were processing claims and unauthorized 
commitments, handling some contract payment issues between the vendor and 
the finance office (regarding old contract actions), conducting training, and 
closing out contracts awarded long ago or by criminal contracting officers.  
Contract administration does include vendor pay problems and contract closeout, 
but many other functions are necessary to oversee contract performance.  The 
Contract Administration Division was functioning as problem solvers, not as a 
true administration division. 
The recommendation is to structure the command to fit with the modern 
“cradle to grave” contracting methodology.  This is especially important in a 
contingency environment with a high turnover rate in personnel.  Teams could be 
assigned contracts which are tracked via the existing Access database ensuring 
greater accountability for all actions.   
4. Technology 
A key element of this design factor for USACC-KU is the condition of the 
inadequate condition of physical facilities and equipment.  The building housing 
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USACC-KU was too small for the amount of personnel working in the command 
during the 2007 – 2008 timeframe.  Small work areas are often shared by four 
individuals, middle mangers share office space with employees and contractors, 
and some staff members work in buildings in separate locations.  Cramped 
workspaces eliminate privacy or personal space.  The modular furniture in the 
shared offices did not match other rooms, further distressing the overall 
coordination of workspace.  In some cases, stretching your arms out means 
bumping into your neighbor.  The desk arrangements in the average four-person 
office positioned two people with their backs to the door, meaning one person’s 
chair was hit by the opening door.      
Several of the employees surveyed commented on the inadequate 
facilities.  They addressed workstations falling apart, the lack of space, and 
concerns of illness spreading easily due to the limited spacing between people.  
One employee surveyed stated, “The working environment is extremely cramped 
and simply not conducive to the conduct of professional business.  Four people 
in a 12x10 foot room where workstations are two feet apart is inadequate.  It is 
amazing we are not sick more often.”49   
The command recognized the need for increased workspace and better 
working conditions and took action by building an additional structure near the 
existing building.  Renovations are underway on one floor of the original facility to 
convert the four-person offices into two.  Recommendation is for the command to  
continue remodeling and increase efforts to complete the new building.  Once the 
building is complete and personnel move into areas with new furniture and 
additional space, morale and productivity should increase. 
5. Process/Subsystems  
Communication is a critical element for any organization’s success.  At 
USACC-KU, a lack of written plans and poor communication caused frustration, 
                                            
49 Survey response from Anonymous Source #2, Employee. 
 71
confusion, and disruption within the command.  For example, the commander 
once decided to have a late work start time on Monday.  At approximately 1800 
hours, the Saturday prior, leadership decided to notify all by testing the 
organization’s telephone roster, or phone tree.  Approximately four hours later, 
an employee at the bottom of the phone tree received the message promulgated 
via the roster.  The message no longer included information about the authorized 
late arrival, only that the call was to test the notification system.  Others did not 
receive the message and reported at the normal time.  Another example of poor 
communication is the method of notification regarding shifting personnel among 
workstations.  On several occasions, employees were moved to different 
workstations at night or on the weekend.  Returning to work with a hand written 
name change on the door causes obvious frustration, confusion, and inefficiency.  
There are other examples demonstrating poor communication. 
The Employee Survey included a request to rate USACC-KU 
management’s communication, “Management effectively communicates 
important information: Not at all, Rarely, Less than half the time, More than half 
the time, or Almost always.”  Ten of the 14 (or 71%) indicated “rarely” or “less 
than half the time.”  One employee stated, “Communication to the employees 
was a knee jerk reaction to whatever inquiry was being made or what somebody 
thought would help.”50 
The command recognized this problem and began issuing a Plan of the 
Day, which was issued inconsistently.  Obviously, a published POD could show 
employees that their managers know something about where the command is 
heading and its daily priorities.   
C. RESULTS  
The third and final element of the OSF model are results, including the 
organization’s culture, outputs, and outcomes. 
                                            
50 Survey response from Anonymous Source #2, Employee. 
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1. Culture 
Like most organizations, there is a dominant culture and several sub-
cultures.  With the mix of personnel (military, civilian and contractor employees), 
sub-cultures would be anticipated.  The primary culture reflects uniformed 
personnel, but civilians add at least two more sub-cultures.  Combining these 
cultures into one organization with the assumption that civilians will behave as 
soldiers is a recipe for dysfunction and potential animosity between sub-cultures. 
The director or chief position at USACC-KU is an Army O-5, equivalent to 
a Battalion Command position.  Civilian employees at the GS-14 level normally 
hold these positions, especially in stateside organizations.  The majority of the 
employees and middle managers at USACC-KU are civilian employees with the 
number of military members varying based on the needs of the command (i.e., 
changes in mission, inability to fill positions, etc.).  The proposed TDA (or “to-be” 
model) for USACC-KU in Figure 6 above reflects an organization with an 84% 
civilian staff.  Regardless of the current or future structure, the number of civilians 
consistently outnumbers the military.   
Military are trained and socialized under different leadership styles than 
civilians.  Army leaders expect mission focused soldiers to set aside their 
personal preferences to meet objectives.  They are trained on Army doctrine and 
decision making, planning, and directing subordinates.  Civilian employees who 
traditionally worked for civilian leaders are not accustomed to that environment, 
i.e., another misfit.  The employee-employer relationship differs from a 
commander-soldier relationship.  Although both military and civilian structures 
include a chain of command, it holds a stronger meaning in the military.  These 
differences cause cultural clashes when civilian personnel attempt to meet the 
expectations of an Army commander. 
Military and civilian sub-cultures often prefer to work with “their own” 
based on their social norms developed over decades.  A military leader in the 
command indicated he preferred to work with military members.  Again, the 
 73
notion of finding ways to lesson this gap is the point.  Many survey respondents 
addressed concerns regarding differences in the treatment between military and 
civilians style.  For example, one indicated there was “…little apparent respect for 
civilian employees, yet contracting commands cannot function without 
civilians…”51 Another included the following statement, “Civilians were treated as 
inferiors.”52 
While operating in a contingency environment, a commander would be 
expected to focus almost exclusively on the mission.  The recommendation is to 
find a way to also focus on all the human resources in the organization.  
Recommendation is to acknowledge cultural differences and create work venues 
to close the gap.  Prior to assuming command, leaders must understand all their 
employees, not jus the ones in uniform.  Real or perceived differences in status 
between groups is predictive of trouble in multiple areas.  The idea is that 
selected military leaders operating in this heavily civilian environment must also 
fit better with civilian norms and expectations.  There are ways to encourage 
different cultures to work together while still maintaining separate cultural 
identities, e.g., joint MWR trips outside of the camp or social events on camp 
after duty hours designed to purposefully encourage cohesiveness.  
Recommendation is that OPD not be conducted solely for military officers.  
Consider turning it into a “LPD” (Leaders Professional Development) and include 
middle-management and team leaders within the command.  Regardless of one’s 
preference of working with military or civilian personnel, overall culture has a 
direct bearing on performance.  Although culture runs deep and is slow to 
change, it can be positively and purposefully influenced to minimize animosity 
and to reward productive interactions.  
                                            
51 Survey response from Anonymous Source #9, Employee. 
52 Ibid., #3, Middle Management. 
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2. Outputs 
Providing contract support services is the primary output of USACC-KU.  
The most critical element of that support is the written contract.  Low quality, 
poorly written contracts awarded in FY 2006 and FY 2007 contributed to the 
command’s problems discussed earlier in this paper.  The command experienced 
a turn around in contract quality starting gradually in 2007.  Improvements were 
then observed in FY 2008.  The researcher observed this improvement when 
comparing actions reviewed as a member of the IRT to those reviewed while 
serving as a PA on the USACC-KU staff.  The actions reviewed as part of the 
IRT were written in FY 2005, 06 and 07.  PA reviews were conducted on 2008 
contracts.  Substantial improvement was identified between these two time 
periods.  Improvements in FY 2008 contracts includes:  contract format 
consistent with regulation; contracts properly competed and if not, proper 
justifications present; reasons for modifications were documented in contract file; 
contract line items reflected what was purchased in lieu of generic statements 
such as “lot” or “set”; and bulk funded purchase requests, similar to a check 
book, were properly documented.   
The employee surveys requested a “contract quality” rating (poor, 
adequate, good, or excellent) upon arrival and departure from the command (or 
currently if still at USACC-KU).  Of the 14 respondents who were present in FY 
2007 and 2008, two indicated no improvement; rating “adequate” for both time 
periods.  The majority (42 percent) indicated contract quality moved from “poor” 
to “good” while 21 percent annotated an adjustment from “poor” to “adequate.”  
This data supports researcher’s observations of a recognizable improvement in 
the output contract support.  
Several factors contributed to the improvement:  processing requirements 
using only Simplified Acquisition Procedures, decreased workload, and the 
implementation of an Acquisition Instruction issued by the PARC.  In addition, 
implementation of an USCC-KU internal review process was critical.  Reviewers, 
PAs and attorneys, work as a team with the contracting officers and specialists 
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during the contract process, not only after the contract was completed.  This 
integrated process team approach led to collaboration, synergy, a team approach 
to challenges and ultimately, end product improvement.  USACC-KU should 
continue the IPT approach to reviews and enforce use of the PARC’s Acquisition 
Instruction.  
3. Outcomes 
Of the outcomes at USAC-KU, customer satisfaction is the most 
important.  The USCC-KU mission is to provide “…contracting support… that 
enables the Warfighter to accomplish their mission.”  In 2006 and early 2007, 
contracts lapsed, most were poorly written, and many were not regulation 
compliant.  This was not without impact upon USACC-KU or support staff in 
warfighter units, who struggled through the procurement process.  Taxpayers 
may have paid more for contracted services without commensurate value on 
mission accomplishment.  No warfighter went without fuel in their vehicles, food 
in their stomachs or a safe place to sleep at night, thanks to guards around 
Camp Arifjan.  All of these services were contracted by USACC-KU.  
Nonetheless, in the end, USACC-KU accomplished their mission:  the warfighter 
missed or lacked nothing.  The end user, the most important USACC-KU 
stakeholder/customer, appeared satisfied.  USACC-KU was effective, but not 
efficient.  
The efforts of those assigned to USACC-KU in 2007 and 2008 saw 
improvement at USCC-KU as a system:  efficiency increased.  This meant 
different outcomes for the staff of USACC-KU: operational tempo eased, work 
was more predictable and stress levels began to drop.  Warfighter support staff 
members enjoyed the change in USACC-KU because customer service 
improved:  accessibility increased, contracting officers trained their customers in 
the basics of contracting, and collaboration occurred resulting in higher levels of 
staff satisfaction.  Contractors saw an increased level of professionalism in  
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USACC-KU.  Competitions were run smoothly and resulting contract awards 
were irrefutably fair.  Increased efficiency was invisible to the end user mentioned 
above, but other stakeholders welcomed it.   
The employee surveys requested a “customer service” rating (poor, 
adequate, good, or excellent) upon arrival and departure from the command (or 
currently if still at USACC-KU).  Of the 14 respondents, three saw no 
improvement.  The majority witnessed an improvement one level above rating 
upon arrival.  Of those, 23% indicated customer service increased from “poor” to 
“good” and 23% annotated a change “poor” to “adequate.”  This data supports 
the researcher’s observations of an improvement in customer service at USACC-
KU. 
Effectiveness is critical to military operations, including those of USCC-
KU.  Efficiency in this case is also critical.  It is efficiency that improves USCC-KU 
staff member quality of life, and thereby, retention and recruitment.  Therefore, 
USACC-KU should foster efficiency.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis was, “How can an 
organizational systems assessment be used to explain organizational and 
behavioral results – intended and unintended consequences – experienced at 
the U.S. Army Contracting Command-Kuwait during the 2006-2008 timeframe?”  
This thesis also asked  how the theory could be translated or used in an Army 
operational environment, e.g., OCONUS contingency contracting arena.  A 
researcher-generated survey was conducted, obtaining an array of perceptions 
gleaned from overseas, wartime, contract professionals.  The researcher also 
drew from personal experience gained while working at USACC-KU during the 
relevant time period.  Results of the analysis in the previous chapter revealed 
that key variables appeared to be incongruent, which may have contributed to 
documented organizational dysfunctions.  
During the two-year period considered for this project, USACC-KU 
experienced substantial changes.  The organization drew attention from the 
highest levels of the Army when fraud, conspiracy, and corruption charges were 
publicized in 2007.    
The following recommendations apply:  
 
1) Initiate meaningful morale-building events into the command’s 
schedule, and encourage use of existing MWR programs; 
2) Actively review and select the “right people” to fill positions at 
USACC-KU; 
3) Establish clear and compelling short- and long-range goals, involve 
personnel and communicate goals throughout the command, and 
establish metrics to ensure and track the implementation of needed 
changes; 
4) Ensure adherence to local policies and procedures for all contract 
actions, regardless of dollar amount; 
5) Consolidate command structure to accommodate the modern 
“cradle to grave” contracting methodology; 
6) Continue and expedite improving physical facilities; 
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7) Obtain assistance and implement strategic communications to 
ensure continuity of direction and command intent;  
8) Obtain assistance and improve the Integrated Process Team 
approach, e.g., team-building efforts, ensuring real and perceived 
equity between civilian and military personnel. 





A. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Organizational Analysis of the U.S. Army Contracting Command-Kuwait 
By Kris Orr 
 




1.  Your highest level of education. 
__ High School Diploma 
__ College Degree 
__ Post Graduate Courses 
__ Masters Degree 
__ Doctorate Degree 
 
2.  Your highest DAWIA level of certification in contracting. 
 __ Level I 
 __ Level II 
 __ Level III 
 





4.  Your current rank, if Army civilian or military:  _________________ 
 
5.  Your position title at USACC-KU:  __________________________ 
 
6.  Total years and months you have been involved in government contracting: 
 _________ Years and ________ Months 
 
7.  Position in the command between 2006-2008:  
 __ Permanent 
 __ TDY 
 
8.  Dates (month/year) you have worked for USACC-KU? 
 From _____ 200_  to _____ 200_ 
 80
9. How was the direction of the command primarily communicated to employees 
during 2006/08, e.g., Vision? Mission? Goals? Strategic plan? 
 
 
10. What does it take for contingency contracting to be successful at USACC-KU 
during 2006/08, e.g., factors needed to succeed in that context? 
 
 
11. What were the most important issues facing the command when you arrived; 
issues which had to be dealt with, and which the command had some degree of 
control? 
 Issue One: 
 
 
 Issue Two: 
 
 
12.  Overall, contract quality when you arrived was:   
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
13.  Overall, contract quality currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
14.  Overall, the quality of contract administration when you arrived was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
15.  Overall, the quality of contract administration currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
16.  Overall, the quality of customer service when you arrived was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
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 __ Excellent 
 
17.  Overall, the quality of customer service currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
 
18.  Overall, the senior leadership at the command in 2006/08 was: 
 __ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good  
 __ Excellent 
 
 
19. Briefly describe the reward system used at USACC-KU during 2006/08, e.g., 
reward system includes punishment/discipline: 
 
 
20.  Overall, USACC-KU receive contingency contracting personnel with the 
necessary knowledge, skill sets, and abilities to succeed in the 2006/08 context: 
 __ Most of the time 
 __ Over half the time 
 __ Less than half the time 
 __ Hardly ever 
 




22.  What factors motivated you to accept a position or temporary assignment in 
this organization? 
 
23.  My overall work expectations are/were being met: 
__ Not at all 
 __ Somewhat 
 __ Moderately 
 __ Substantially 
 __ N/A 
 
24.  The organization’s training program has improved my knowledge/skills: 
 __ Not at all 
 __ Somewhat 
 __ Moderately 
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 __ Substantially 
 __ N/A 
 
25.  Management effectively communicates important information: 
 __ Not at all 
 __ Rarely 
 __ Less than half the time 
 __ More than half the time 




B. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Organizational Analysis of the U.S. Army Contracting Command-Kuwait 
By Kris Orr 
 




1.  Your highest level of education. 
__ High School Diploma 
__ College Degree 
__ Post Graduate Courses 
__ Masters Degree 
__ Doctorate Degree 
 
2.  Your highest DAWIA level of certification in contracting. 
 __ Level I 
 __ Level II 
 __ Level III 
 





4.  Your current rank, if Army civilian or military:  _________________ 
 
5.  Your position title at USACC-KU:  __________________________ 
 
6.  Total years and months you have been involved in government contracting: 
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 _________ Years and ________ Months 
 
7.  Position in the command between 2006-2008:  
 __ Permanent 
 __ TDY 
 
8.  Dates (month/year) you have worked for USACC-KU? 
 From _____ 200_  to _____ 200_ 
 
9. How was the direction of the command primarily communicated to employees 
during 2006/08, e.g., Vision? Mission? Goals? Strategic plan? 
 
 
10.  How were command desired outputs communicated to employees in 
2006/08? 
 
11. What does it take for contingency contracting to be successful at USACC-KU 
during 2006/08, e.g., factors needed to succeed in that context? 
 
 
12. What were the most important issues facing the command when you arrived; 
issues which had to be dealt with, and which the command had some degree of 
control? 
 Issue One: 
 
 
 Issue Two: 
 
 
13.  Overall, contract quality when you arrived was:   
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
14.  Overall, contract quality currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
15.  Overall, the quality of contract administration when you arrived was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
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 __ Excellent 
 
16.  Overall, the quality of contract administration currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
17.  Overall, the quality of customer service when you arrived was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
18.  Overall, the quality of customer service currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
19.  List the three most important external stakeholders at USACC-KU during 
2006/08: 
 
 1.                
 
 











21.  Overall, the senior leadership at the command in 2006/08 was: 
 __ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good  
 __ Excellent 
 
22.  Overall, how much interdependency is needed among contingency 
contracting employees during 2006/08? 
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 __ Little to no interdependency needed 
 __ Some needed 
 __ Moderate amount needed 
 
23.  What are the basic groupings of activities and people at USACC-KU in 
2006/08? Check those that apply: 
 __ Traditional departmental divisions by function 
 __ Mainly individual work 
 __ Teams and Task Forces used 
 __ Matrix 
 
24. Briefly describe the reward system used at USACC-KU during 2006/08, e.g., 
reward system includes punishment/discipline: 
 
 
25.  Overall, USACC-KU receive contingency contracting personnel with the 
necessary knowledge, skill sets, and abilities to succeed in the 2006/08 context: 
 __ Most of the time 
 __ Over half the time 
 __ Less than half the time 
 __ Hardly ever 
 
 
C. SENIOR MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Organizational Analysis of the U.S. Army Contracting Command-Kuwait 
By Kris Orr 
 




1.  Your highest level of education. 
__ High School Diploma 
__ College Degree 
__ Post Graduate Courses 
__ Masters Degree 
__ Doctorate Degree 
 
2.  Your highest DAWIA level of certification in contracting. 
 __ Level I 
 __ Level II 
 __ Level III 
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4.  Your current rank, if Army civilian or military:  _________________ 
 
5.  Your position title at USACC-KU:  __________________________ 
 
6.  Total years and months you have been involved in government contracting: 
 
 _________ Years and ________ Months 
 
7.  Position in the command between 2006-2008:  
 __ Permanent 
 __ TDY 
 
8.  Dates (month/year) you have worked for USACC-KU? 
 From _____ 200_  to _____ 200_ 
 
9. How was the direction of the command primarily communicated to employees 
during 2006/08, e.g., Vision? Mission? Goals? Strategic plan? 
 
 
10.  Briefly describe the mandate of the command pertaining to contingency 
contracting in 2006/08, things the command must and should be doing. 
 
 








13. What does it take for contingency contracting to be successful at USACC-KU 




14. What were the most important issues facing the command when you arrived; 
issues which had to be dealt with, and which the command had some degree of 
control? 
 Issue One: 
 
 Issue Two: 
 
 
14.  Overall, contract quality when you arrived was:   
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
15.  Overall, contract quality currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
16.  Overall, the quality of contract administration when you arrived was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
17.  Overall, the quality of contract administration currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
18.  Overall, the quality of customer service when you arrived was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
 
19.  Overall, the quality of customer service currently or when you left was: 
__ Poor 
 __ Adequate 
 __ Good 
 __ Excellent 
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20.  List the three most important external stakeholders at USACC-KU during 
2006/08: 
 
 1.                
 
 










22.  Briefly describe the reward system used at USACC-KU during 2006/08, e.g., 
reward system includes punishment/discipline: 
 
 
23.  Overall, USACC-KU receive contingency contracting personnel with the 
necessary knowledge, skill sets, and abilities to succeed in the 2006/08 context: 
 __ Most of the time 
 __ Over half the time 
 __ Less than half the time 
 __ Hardly ever 
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